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CHAPTER 1
"SATAN AND LUCIFER"
When Franklin Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill
at Quebec in August of 1943 the conference was publicly
billed as dealing with military matters affecting both the
Pacific and European theaters of war. By this time the
military situation had turned decidedly in favor of the
Allies. The Soviets were delivering smashing blows to the
Germans on the eastern front, the North African campaign
against Rommel had been successful and Anglo-American forces
were completing operations in Sicily. However, the presence
of American Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden led to press speculation that
postwar political issues were also on the agenda. As the
military situation became more favorable the wartime
political alliance seemed to deteriorate.
Postwar political issues began taking on greater
significance in early 1943, and would occupy more and more
of FDR's thinking as the year progressed. In January,
William C. Bullitt, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union wrote a lengthy memorandum to Roosevelt in which he
outlined his fears that Stalin would attempt to dominate
Europe at the end of the war. Bullitt, in a speech at New
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York in July 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of
Russia, likened the struggle between the two totalitarian
powers as "a war between Satan and Lucifer." He concluded
the best course of action for the U.S. would be to let the
Germans and Russians fight it out among themselves in the
belief that the winner would be so weakened as to no longer
threaten Europe. [1]
The very military successes which prompted the
decision to meet at Quebec were at the heart of Bullitt's
memorandum to FDR
.
It was now apparent that the Soviets not
only stopped Hitler's Wehrmacht in 1942, but, with the
encirclement and destruction of Paul us ' Sixth Army at
Stalingrad, were poised to begin throwing the Germans back
in 1943. Bullitt f s current concern seems to have been that
Satan [or Lucifer, he did not designate which country
represented whom] was about to emerge from the struggle, but
not in the weakened condition originally forecast.
FDR seems to have been impressed with Bullitt's
argument, who said that the closer the Allies came to
defeating Germany the less influence they would have on
getting Stalin to agree on any postwar agreements. Now was
the time to apply pressure while "Your club would have lead
in it, not cotton." He suggested that FDR threaten a Pacific
first strategy, reduction in aid to the Soviets, possible
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difficulty in providing postwar aid to rebuild the Soviet
Union, and expressing full opposition to "predatory Soviet
policy in Europe and Asia." He also advocated striking
against Germany through the Balkans rather than France, but
only if that decision were based on sound military
considerations. FDR met with Bullitt to discuss the memo and
asked him to continue to keep him informed on his thinking
regarding the political situation as he saw it. [2]
The President also raised the issues contained in
Bullitt's memo with British Foreign Minister Eden in March.
He asked if Eden believed that Stalin's ultimate aim was to
dominate and communize Europe. Eden responded there was no
way to know for sure, but that even if that were his
intention the Allies should continue to work with him and
assume he intended to honor his treaty obligations. Eden
added he was surprised by Roosevelt's belief that Poland
would not prove to be a difficult question to resolve at the
end of the war. FDR felt territorial concessions of East
Prussia and parts of Silesia would make Poland a net gainer
if the Curzon Line were accepted as its eastern border.
According to Eden, FDR was also prepared to accept Russian
demands on Finland and the Baltic States, but hoped the
Russians would conduct plebiscites to ratify their
actions
.
[ 3
]
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Complicating the political situation was the German
announcement in April of the discovery of a mass grave in
the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland. The grave contained the
remains of some 10,000 Polish army officers. The Germans
claimed the Russians massacred the Polish officers after
occupying eastern Poland in 1939. Stalin immediately denied
the charge, claiming instead that the Germans themselves had
killed the Poles. FDR and Churchill supported Stalin's
position, arguing the Germans were attempting to sow
dissension among the allies, and also to distract worldwide
attention from their own massacre then underway of Jews in
the Warsaw ghetto. However, in London, the Polish
government-in-exile requested an investigation of the charge
by the International Red Cross. Stalin immediately severed
relations with the London Poles, further complicating the
situation
.
While the Allies were struggling to maintain a
semblance of unity in the face of the Katyn accusations FDR
began making plans to meet with Stalin one-on-one. While
Churchill had already held face-to-face meetings with the
Soviet Premier, the President had yet to meet his Russian
counterpart. In early May, as FDR and Churchill were
preparing for the Trident Conference, to be held in
Washington, the President sent former Ambassador to the
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Soviet Union Joseph Davies to Moscow. Davies was to relay to
Stalin the President's desire to meet sometime in July,
without the presence of the British. Stalin initially agreed
to the meeting, but expressed doubts to Davies that such a
meeting could take place in the absence of the opening of a
second front in Europe.
Davies reported to FDR that failure to open the
promised second front would have far-reaching consequences
on Soviet attitudes on the prosecution of the war and their
participation in the peace. Stalin's trust in his allies was
obviously diminishing. Whether he believed the Allies were
deliberately holding back and letting the Germans and
Russians slug it out, as Bullitt had publicly suggested, is
uncertain. He did believe that the Soviets were carrying the
brunt of the fighting, and expected another major German
offensive in the summer. He also believed the successful
North African campaign and the Allied air offensive against
Germany were insufficient substitutes for the promised
cross-Channel attack. [4]
The results of the Trident Conference were exactly
what Stalin feared. Churchill persuaded FDR to postpone the
cross-Channel attack in favor of securing the Mediterranean,
and possibly driving Italy out of the war. Stalin sent an
angry reply to Roosevelt's cable informing him of the
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Trident decisions. The Soviets could not consent to these
agreements, again reached without Soviet participation, "and
without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly
important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent
course of the war." Churchill, now aware that FDR was
planning to meet with Stalin without him, began pressing for
a Big Three meeting. Stalin refused, citing pressing needs
on the eastern front which required his presence, although
the Germans had not mounted a major summer offensive as
expected . [5 ]
So as FDR and Churchill came together at Quebec for
their sixth meeting of the war the political alliance seemed
to be coming apart. Stalin's reaction to this meeting was as
acrimonious as his earlier cable to FDR, "To date it has
been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement
bet we en themselves while the U.S.S.R. is informed of the
agreement between the two powers as a third party looking
passively on." [6]
The Soviet Premier continued to express growing
distrust of his allies. Quebec demonstrated his allies
growing distrust of him. The conference produced a secret
agreement regarding the Tube Alloys Project - the atomic
bomb. The agreement stipulated that the weapon would never
be used by either partner against the other or against a
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third party without the consent of the other. It also
stipulated that information about the project could not be
passed to a third party except by mutual consent. This in
effect gave both FDR and Churchill a veto over informing
Stalin about the development of the bomb or sharing
information about it. [7]
FDR did press the British about committing to the
cross-Channel attack in the Spring of 1944 at Quebec. They
also agreed to pursue a meeting of the Big Three later that
Fall. When the meeting broke up both men took short
vacations before returning to Washington for further
discussions. Historians have repeatedly attempted to
determine just what Roosevelt's thinking was at this
critical juncture, as preparations began for the first
meeting of the Big Three later that year at Teheran. The
controversy seems to revolve around just how much FDR's
conversations with Bullitt and Eden earlier in the year
reflected his real thinking, and how much may have been pure
speculation. Herbert Feis contends these early discussions
were an "exercise in imagination" and that "the record of
these discussions leaves the impression that they were
conducted in a vacuum." Gaddis Smith, on the other hand,
argues that policy was being based on a combination of
naivete and stereotypes held by FDR and his advisors. This
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resulted in a formulation of policy "on the basis of hopes
and illusion rather than ascertainable fact." Robert Dallek
presents yet another position contending that Roosevelt was
indeed influenced by Bullitt's arguments and that "he was
uncertain about postwar relations with Russia, he wished to
assure against the possibility that Stalin aimed at
extensive European control." [8]
By the time Churchill arrived in Washington on
September 1, Italy had accepted the surrender terms of the
Allies. The President invited Archbishop Francis J. Spellman
of New York to dine at the White House along with the Prime
Minister. The following morning FDR met privately with
Spellman for more than an hour. The Archbishop recorded his
impressions of what the President said in a two-page memo
that he sent to the Vatican, to his longtime friend and
mentor Pope Pius XII. This document presents a very
different picture regarding the firmness of FDR's views on
the postwar world. According to Spellman, FDR forecast a
postwar world dominated by "spheres of influence" among the
"big four." China would have the dominant interest in the
Far East; the U.S. in the Pacific; Britain and Russia in
Europe and Africa. However, Spellman said FDR believed
Russia would dominate Europe because of Britain's
"predominately colonial interests." While Chaing Kai-shek
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would be consulted on "the great decisions concerning
Europe" he would have no influence on them. Moreover, the
U.S. would be in much the same position as Chaing on
European matters "although to a lesser degree." FDR hoped
the Russian domination of Europe "would not be too harsh,"
according to Spellman, "Although that might be wishful
thinking. "[9]
It is interesting to note from this portion of
Spellman's memo that FDR did not foresee a major role for
the U.S. in Europe after the war. Much of what the President
did in the remaining months of the war takes on new meaning
when seen from this perspective.
Spellman restated the President's desire to establish
a personal relationship with Stalin. He would seek a meeting
with Stalin as soon as possible in the belief that he was
better able to reach an accommodation with the Soviet leader
than Churchill. Stalin's postwar territorial aims were
outlined, "He would certainly receive; Finland, the Baltic
States, the Eastern half of Poland, Bessarabia." The
President had decided, according to Spellman, that there was
no sense in opposing these territorial desires of Stalin's
because he had the power to get them anyway. In essence FDR
acknowledged that he would accept the Soviet frontiers in
existence on June 21, 1941, the date of the German invasion
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of Russia. Stalin had been pressing for the recognition of
these borders since December of 1941. He had proposed a
secret protocol to Foreign Minister Eden to the treaty of
alliance between Russia and Britain. Both the British and
the U.S. had opposed the recognition of these borders. FDR
outlined for Spellman the same position he took in his
discussions with Eden in March; the Baltics would be
absorbed by Russia, eastern Poland would be taken as well.
FDR then went on to outline for Spellman more far
reaching consequences of the changing military and political
situation, far more than he revealed to Eden. According to
Spellman, FDR confirmed to him the probability that Stalin
would attempt to set up communist governments in the areas
not incorporated directly into the Soviet Union. The
President conceded that Austria, Hungary and Croatia would
"fall under some sort of Russian protectorate." When the
archbishop asked if the Allies intended to support
noncommunist elements in those countries to help prevent
communist takeovers FDR replied "no such move was
contemplated." The President seemed to be agreeing with the
most pessimistic evaluation of Soviet aims outlined by
Bullitt in January. [10]
The picture presented here contrasts sharply with
those of an undecided, naive President about to embark on an
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attempt to prevent Soviet power from expanding in Europe.
Rather, he has a firm grasp of the postwar realities created
by the increasing military strength of the Soviet Union. He
believes the Soviets will be the dominant power in Europe.
He believes the Soviets will attempt to install communist
governments in several eastern European countries, and is
making no plans to counter such a development. FDR told the
archbishop, and through him the Vatican, that all of eastern
Europe from the Baltic States to the Balkans will be either
incorporated into the Soviet Union or fall under Soviet
domination. Furthermore, he will do nothing to assist or
support elements within those countries which might resist
such a development, and the United States and Britain cannot
fight the Russians to prevent their takeover of eastern
Europe. The arguments put forth by Bullitt to prevent the
expansion of Soviet power have been rejected.
The fact that Spellman swiftly notified the Vatican of
the president's postwar outlook is clear evidence of his
concern over what FDR had confided to him. The prospect of
Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Austria and
Czechoslovakia - all predominantly Catholic countries -
coming under communist influence was not something the
Vatican would take lightly. The question remains why FDR
would be telling the Archbishop of New York all this in the
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first place? Surely he knew Spellman would inform the
Vatican of this discussion. He also risked the possibility
the information would leak to the press and create a storm
of protest. The answer seems to lie in the fact that this
was not a new initiative on FDR's part, but rather a
confirmation to the Vatican of an already established trend
of thinking on postwar problems. The evidence seems to
suggest that FDR had reached decisions on the need to
accommodate the extension of Soviet power in Europe as early
as mid-1942, and conveyed this to the Vatican through his
personal representative Myron C. Taylor.
In August of 1942, while Italy was still an active
member of the Axis alliance, Taylor was spirited into Rome
for meetings with the Pope and his top advisors. Sumner
Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and FDR's man in the
State Department, initiated the idea to send Taylor back to
Rome in the midst of hostilities. FDR agreed "that it would
be useful for Myron Taylor to go back to the Vatican .... But
how can we get him there." Arrangements were apparently made
through the Italian Government in the belief that Taylor
would transmit to the Pope conditions under which the
Italians could withdraw from the war. The records of
Taylor's meetings with the Pope, however, reveal that much
more was being discussed, and the Italian situation was
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rarely mentioned
.[ 11
]
Taylor seemed intent on conveying to Pius XII, and his
Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the nature of
postwar Europe, and in particular the role of Russia. Taylor
stressed the Russian signature to the Atlantic Charter
"which, among other things, asserts adherence to the
principle of religious freedom, and by its expressed
attitude toward Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States, in the
discussion of postwar settlements," had led the
administration to believe "the field is open for
collaboration
- and generous compromise." Taylor impressed
upon the Pope and his advisors the need for Russian
cooperation at the end of the war without which "the future
stability of Europe" would be endangered. Russia would gain
security through an effective international organization
dedicated to the prevention of German rearmament, and in
return would be asked only to "cease her ideological
propaganda in other countries, and to make religion really
free within her borders." According to Taylor, the Pope and
his advisors were very impressed with the fact that
consideration of postwar matters was already well under way.
[12]
Taylor met privately the following day with Cardinal
Secretary of State Maglione and again brought up the
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question of Russia and her postwar attitude "which is very
much in the minds of everyone here." He raised the
possibility of establishing a "buffer organization of states
...between Germany and Russia" to ensure Russian security
and reducing her need "to gain territory in the less rich
areas surrounding her on the west." Taylor did not spell out
just how this "buffer organization of states" was to be
created, only that the matter was under consideration
.[ 13
]
The evidence seems to suggest that FDR developed a
postwar strategy very early in the war, much earlier than
historians have commonly thought. He communicated important
elements of that plan to the Vatican as early as September
1942, while the Allies were still on the defensive (the
battle of Stalingrad was just beginning). Historians have
largely overlooked FDR's wartime communications with the
Vatican as a source for providing a clear indication of what
he planned to accomplish. For example, British Foreign
Minister Eden was taken by surprise in March of 1943 when
FDR suggested that Poland would not present a difficult
problem to resolve at the end of the war. FDR suggested to
him that East Prussia and parts of Silesia would more than
compensate Poland for possible loss of territory to Russia
in the east. Prior to Taylor's departure for discussions
with the Pope the State Department prepared "a special map
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of Germany" for Taylor based on "The instruction ... to show
the Germanized Slav sandy plain of Brandenburg." The
commentary accompanying the map states "Practically all of
Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia and the Kingdom of Saxony
are still inhabited by a stock whose anthropological
characteristics are basically Slav." The document goes on to
state that "Polish sovereignty at no time extended over so
wide an area, but stopped at the western frontier of
Silesia, some miles west of the Oder River," and concluded
with the comment that "For purposes of the present map, the
Oder has been selected as the western limit of the
Germanized Slav area," and that it approximated the
westernmost extension of Polish rule. As Taylor left for
Rome in September of 1942 he carried with him the outline of
possible future borders of Poland which Roosevelt would
allude to six months later to Foreign Minister Eden. [14]
Yet another element of Roosevelt's postwar thinking is
revealed in the Taylor documents. Upon leaving Rome, Taylor
went to London where he held conversations with Averell
Harriman and Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky on the subject of
developing "a brief formula that would be the basis for a
declaration by Stalin that would encourage the thought that
religion in Russia would actually be free." While in London
he sought the opinion of one of the leading authorities on
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the Soviet Union concerning the question of religion in
Russia, and what effect that might have within territories
occupied by the Soviets after the war. George Kennan, then
temporarily assigned to the embassy in Lisbon, outlined in a
three page memorandum dated October 2, 1942, the Soviet's
hostility to the Russian Orthodox Church and religion in
general. Kennan related a number of instances of a "great
resurgence" of religious life in German occupied areas of
Russia. While acknowledging the accounts may have been
exaggerated by the Germans for their own propaganda
purposes, he concluded they "are naturally not without their
effects on the religious populations of the other eastern
European countries," and "They doubtless tend to increase
the horror with which these people view the prospect of
Russian occupation after the war." [15]
As a result of these wartime experiences, Kennan said
it should "be evident to anyone that a greater real
tolerance of religious life in Soviet controlled territories
would be in the interests of the Soviet Government itself,
both now and in the future." Kennan acknowledged the
difficulty of "achieving such cooperation and
understanding." The problem, as he saw it, lay not so much
with the concept of religious freedom itself, but with the
potential of foreign influence. He compared the communist
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rulers of Russia with the Czars of the 15th and 16th
centuries who "fought Roman religious influence, not so much
out of convictions of dogma as out of fear of foreign
influence on a backward and credulous people, so the present
rulers tend to feel that any foreign influence, religious or
otherwise, challenges the security of their rule." Kennan's
memorandum concluded, "If these preoccupations could be
overcome and if the Kremlin could be induced to tolerate
religion at home and to receive the proffered cooperation of
western religious movements in the spirit of friendliness
and confidence, I believe one of the greatest barriers to a
sound future peace would have been removed." [16]
Upon returning to the U.S. Taylor resumed
correspondence with Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit,
taking up with him the question of what type of statement
would be necessary from Stalin. Mooney told Taylor "I am
profoundly convinced that a reliable, authoritative
statement on religious freedom in Russia is a 'sine qua non'
of sincere cooperation between America and Russia in post
war problems." Mooney, like Roosevelt, felt that Stalin was
an "utter realist" and that such a statement could be
obtained "if we insist." However, the bishop also believed
that "an ambiguous or evidently insincere declaration would
be fatal to the prestige of the President and to the
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confidence which people must have in him if his high ideals
for the post war settlement are to be realized
substantially." The President's reputation, and acceptance
of his postwar settlements, ultimately hinged on their
acceptance by the American public.
That is why FDR seemed so concerned about keeping the
Vatican well informed about potential postwar territorial
settlements. So much so in fact that he appears to have
informed the Pope and his advisors of his thinking some six
months before making similar thoughts known to his principal
wartime ally. What could the Vatican do? If, as Roosevelt
told Spellman, the combined strength of Britain and the
United States could not prevent Stalin from doing what he
wanted; the Vatican would surely be helpless.
The answer was that the Vatican was not entirely
helpless. It could sway worldwide Catholic public opinion,
and Roosevelt, the consummate politician, knew this. Public
opinion, particularly Catholic opinion, might not have
counted for much in the Soviet Union under Stalin, but it
counted for a great deal in the United States under FDR.
Obviously, Roosevelt was well aware of the importance of the
Catholic vote to his national coalition. He had risen to
political prominence in New York State, where the large,
we 1 1 -o r g a ni z e d Catholic minority was important. On the
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national level the same was true in several key industrial
states of the northeast and Midwest, such as Massachusetts,
Michigan and Illinois with their large bloc of electoral
votes. FDR always had a Catholic in his cabinet; James
Farley through the first two administrations in the
traditionally political position of Postmaster General. When
Farley broke with Roosevelt over the third term issue he was
replaced with another Catholic, Frank Walker.
American Catholic opinion on the wartime alliance with
the Soviet Union was ambivalent at best. The German attack
on Russia in June of 1941 suddenly turned one of the
European aggressor nations into an ally. Even the staunch
anti-communist Winston Churchill was willing to put the past
"with its crimes, its follies, and its tragedies" behind in
the hope that Russia could hold out long enough to let
England catch its breath. When the U.S. entered the war in
December American Catholics found themselves allied with an
ideological enemy of longer standing than Nazism.
Although Catholics were willing to fight Nazis
alongside Russians they, along with other Americans,
remained skeptical of any long-range alliance with the
Soviets. Catholic newspapers and periodicals continued to
remind readers of the nature of the Soviet dictatorship.
Commonweal
.
a liberal Catholic journal reminded readers in
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September of 1942, while Myron Taylor was discussing postwar
issues with the Pope, that the record on Soviet occupation
of Poland was much the same as that of Nazi Germany. "What's
the difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia?"
asked Polish refugee Marta Wankowicz, "In Russia it's
colder. "[17]
Now, a year later, FDR had confirmed to the most
powerful American Catholic prelate, and through him the
Vatican, his vision of a postwar Europe that confirmed
Catholics worst fears. What was he willing to do? The
answer to this question would unfold over the course of the
remainder of the war. The story has never been fully told,
but beginning with Taylor's mission to Rome in 1942 and
continuing through the Yalta conference, FDR attempted to
mediate a rapprochement between the Vatican and the Soviet
Union. He knew the political risk of failure was great, and
might result in the loss of the large Catholic vote to the
Democratic Party.
Events moved rapidly in late 1943 and the long-awaited
meeting of the Big Three took place in November. Teheran,
more so than any of the other conferences of the war,
illustrated the basic interrelationship of domestic
political realities with the President's formulation of
foreign policy. Shortly after the first official meeting
20
adjourned Stalin visited Roosevelt privately. The President
outlined for Stalin his concerns about the 1944 presidential
election. In March FDR had told Eden that reaching a
settlement on Poland would not present a problem. But in
November FDR told Stalin there were six to seven million
voters in the United States of Polish extraction (virtually
all of them Catholic) and as a practical man he did not want
to lose their votes. He told Stalin he agreed with him on
the need to restore the Polish state but he could not
participate in any decision on the subject. When Stalin
replied that he understood the president's position now that
matters had been explained to him, Roosevelt brought up the
similar problem he faced with American voters of Lithuanian,
Latvian, and Estonian heritage (also mostly Catholic). FDR
told Stalin the United States would not go to war over the
issue when the Soviets reoccupied the Baltic Republics, but
the issue for Americans would be the right of
self-determination. FDR raised the possibility of holding a
plebiscite, as he had with Eden and Spellman, and told
Stalin he believed the people of the Baltics would vote to
join the Soviet Union. Stalin replied that the Baltic States
had no autonomy under the czars and he saw no reason why the
issue was being raised now. When the president said the
21
public "neither knows nor understands" Stalin told him "They
should be informed and some propaganda work done." [18]
The "realism" the president spoke of to Spellman in
September was manifesting itself in terms of American
presidential politics in November. The reality was that FDR
did not want to risk losing the Polish Catholic vote, and
possibly the entire Catholic vote, over the Polish border
issue. FDR was well aware of the impact a president's
foreign policy decisions could have on domestic political
alignments. As a vice presidential candidate in 1920 he had
seen the mass desertion of Irish Catholics from the
Democratic Party in the northeast that resulted from
Wilson's pro-British foreign policy and the crushing of the
Easter Rebellion. The evidence presented from the Taylor
mission of 1942 clearly suggests that FDR was thinking in
much larger terms than simple ethnic considerations.
This work will attempt to analyze FDR's postwar policy
within the context of his relationship with American
Catholics. Throughout his Presidency he confronted many
issues, both domestic and international, which hinged on
finding a political solution acceptable to Catholic voters
and the Catholic hierarchy. Virtually all of these involved
accusations of communist sympathies on his part, or within
his administration. To fully appreciate the perspective from
22
which FDR was operating during these critical war years it
is necessary to review these incidents and the impact they
had on his decision to attempt the seemingly impossible: a
rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin.
23
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CHAPTER 2
"HE HASN'T TALKED ABOUT ANYTHING BUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
"
John Adams once remarked that "papists" were as rare
in his hometown of Braintree as comets and earthquakes. The
scarcity of Catholics in the new American Republic did not
prevent the founders from worrying about the provisions
contained in Article Six of the proposed new constitution.
This article prohibited a religious test to hold office in
the new federal government. Major Rusk of Massachusetts
"shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and
Pagans might be introduced to office." A delegate to the
North Carolina ratifying convention took a more long range
view arguing that he "did not suppose that the Pope could
occupy the President's chair," but that in "four or five
hundred years," it was possible "that Papists may occupy"
the Presidency. [1]
In fact, it would take only 140 years for a Catholic
to seek the highest office in the land. By 1928, When Alfred
E. Smith left Houston with the Democratic Party nomination,
the face of America had changed. The great waves of
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century transformed the nation. As if the sheer size of the
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new immigration were not enough to provide native Americans
with a sense of being overwhelmed, the origin of the new
immigrants was even more frightening. Prior to the 1880's,
95 percent of new immigrants came from northwestern Europe.
The new wave was coming from southern and eastern Europe:
Poles, Italians, Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Rumanians,
Spanish and Portuguese. As one historian has noted "most
spoke no English," and, perhaps more importantly,
"Protestantism was foreign to most." The bulk of the new
immigrants were Catholics, Jews and Eastern Orthodox. [2]
Such huge numbers of Catholics seemed to many to
present a clear and present danger to the American way of
life. A midwestern scholar expressed his fear of the new
immigrants religion: "The church to which he [the southern
immigrant] gives allegiance is the Roman Catholic, and,
however much the Catholic Church may do for the ignorant
peasant in his European home, such instruction as the priest
gives is likely to tend toward acceptance of their
subservient position on the part of the working man." The
American ideal of the rugged individual as the basis for
American democracy was clearly challenged by the traditional
paternalism of the Catholic church. [3]
The great waves of immigration also transformed the
nation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. The
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census of 1920 marked the f irst time a majority of Africans
were found to be living in cities. By 1900 the population of
seven of America's largest cities: New York, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Milwaukee, was over
seventy percent comprised of foreign-born stock. Along with
the demographic shift came a shift in political power.
Smith's nomination was a harbinger of that change. Political
power was shifting from rural to urban America, and urban
America was where Catholics were primarily concentrated.
This is dramatically demonstrated by figures released in
1936 which showed that of the fifty largest cities in the
U.S. forty one listed Roman Catholics as the largest single
segment of the population including Providence with 52
percent, Newark with 45, Boston 40, Pittsburgh 35, Cleveland
32, and Milwaukee and St. Paul with 29. [4]
Smith's nomination revived all the old fears of papal
conspiracies and anti-Catholic sentiment previously
manifested in the nativist movement of the 1840's, the Know
Nothing Party of the 1850's and the cry of "Rum, Romanism
and Rebellion" which characterized the election of 1884. The
political resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's was
associated with the anti-urban, anti-foreign, anti-Catholic
and anti-Semitic response to the great immigration in
addition to the anti-black orientation of the original Klan.
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The crushing defeat suffered by Smith cannot be attributed
solely to his Catholicism. Rather, as historian Richard
Hofstadter has pointed out, no Democrat could have defeated
Hoover in 1928. The combination of prosperity, prohibition
and anti-Catholicism combined to make Hoover's victory
overwhelming. Smith's candidacy represented to most
Americans all the evils associated with the immigrants:
Catholicism, corrupt big city political machines, saloons,
crime and vice.
The importance of Smith's candidacy, however, lies not
so much in his defeat, but in his ability to obtain the
nomination in the first place. Smith's nomination secured
the urban ascendancy within the Democratic Party, and that
ascendancy assured Catholics a major role in the selection
of any nominee of the party. A Catholic might not be able to
be elected President, but no Democrat could hope to be
elected without the support of the major urban political
machines, which were predominantly Catholic.
Franklin D. Roosevelt understood this political shift
in power perhaps better than anyone. His campaigns and
leadership reflected it. He rose to political prominence in
New York state where the large, well-organized Catholic
minority was important. He stayed on good terms with Tammany
while at the same time not becoming identified with its
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practices. He nominated Smith for the Presidency in 1928
with his famous "Happy Warrior" speech. Campaigning
vigorously for Smith he criticized both the Klan and the
religious bigotry of the campaign. This resulted in a large
residue of support for FDR among Catholics as the 1932
campaign opened
.
As the depression deepened and the response of the
Hoover administration continued to rely on the traditional
American value of individual responsibility, and the ability
of business to eventually correct the situation, Americans
began questioning the very basis of American culture. The
cultural clash between the "rugged individualism" of native
Protestant America and the "paternalism" of the huge numbers
of Catholic immigrants seemed to collapse in the face of
millions of unemployed, hungry and hopeless workers. In May
of 1931, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Quadraeesimo
Anno marking the fortieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's
encyclical Rerum Novarum ("On the Condition of Labor"). Pius
reaffirmed the teaching of his predecessor affirming the
right of private property, and condemning the socialistic
concept of communal ownership. However, Leo also condemned
the concentration of wealth and the evils resulting from the
modern industrial process. He asserted the obligation of
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owners and employers to provide their workers with
"reasonable and frugal comfort." [5]
More importantly, both pontiffs asserted that if
employers failed to recognize their obligations to provide
for their employees "the public authority must step in to
meet them." In October of 1932, with unemployment
approaching 13 million, FDR made a speech at Detroit quoting
approvingly from Pius XI's Quadrae^l M Ann. . a11 ^ f lt » one
of the greatest documents of all time," and "just as radical
as I am." Was the candidate hinting at the need for
government intervention in the economy on a broader scale
than his previous campaign statements suggested? [6]
While FDR generally received support from American
Catholics on New Deal issues, which affected them directly,
he soon found himself embroiled in a host of foreign-policy
questions which would place him in conflict with one of his
most important constituencies. The new President had been
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration
when the U.S. broke off relations with Russia following the
Bolshevik Revolution. Three succeeding Republican
administrations continued the nonrecogni tion policy, in
spite of the fact that most major world powers had come
around to the reality of dealing with the Soviet government.
During the campaign FDR sidestepped the question of
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e came
recognition, but early in the new administration it b
obvious he was seriously considering the possibility. The
Catholic press and members of the church hierarchy openly
questioned the wisdom of such a move.
Many Catholics were shocked when Al Smith testified in
favor of Russian recognition before the Senate Finance
Committee. He favored more trade with the Soviets, and
dismissed their repudiation of World War I debts to the U.S.
He noted that the U.S. sent troops to Russia to help put
down the revolution although both countries were technically
at peace. Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice president of
Georgetown University, and a leading Catholic authority on
communism, opposed recognition. Father Walsh headed the
Vatican Relief Mission to the Soviet Union from 1919 through
1924, during which there had been much speculation that the
mission signaled a willingness of the Vatican to enter into
a concordat with the Soviets. This Vatican mission was
affiliated with the American Relief Administration headed by
Herbert Hoover. The Russian experience left Walsh a rabid
anti-communist. In 1950, at a dinner in Washington, he would
council the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph R.
McCarthy, to make anti -communism the focus of his reelection
campaign: advice McCarthy would follow wholeheartedly. [7]
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FDR sent a letter to Russian President Kalinin in
October 1933 requesting a representative of the Soviet
government be sent to discuss outstanding issues between the
two countries in the hope of reaching a settlement. Foreign
Commissar Maxim Litvinov was given the assignment. On the
same day Roosevelt met with Father Walsh to review the
issues. The President asked Walsh to prepare a report on the
state of religion in Russia which he said would be used when
serious negotiations began. Walsh quoted the President as
saying "leave it to me Father; I am a good horse dealer." At
the same time the Vatican was expressing its concern about
the possibility America would recognize the Soviet
government. Cardinal Hayes of New York was asked to express
to FDR the Vatican's hope that he would raise the issue of
religious persecution in Russia during his talks with
Litvinov. Hayes submitted a list of proposals for Roosevelt
to discuss. These included: freedom of conscience for
Russians and foreigners; freedom of worship, public and
private; liberation of persons imprisoned for their faith;
and cessation of propaganda against God. [8]
Catholics were not the only Americans opposed to the
recognition of Russia. This division was reflected within
the administration where Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, both Protestants,
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joined with Postmaster General James Farley, a Catholic, in
opposition, although Hull's opposition was based largely on
the potential political consequences of alienating large
segments of Catholic Democrats. Hull proposed negotiating
with the Soviets to permit freedom of religion for American
nationals living in the Soviet Union. At this stage
Auxiliary Bishop of Boston Francis Spellman was brought into
the negotiations. While a student at the American College in
Rome, Spellman became the protege of Cardinal Secretary of
State Eugenio Pacelli. Spellman received a letter from Count
Enrico Galeazzi, a financial advisor to the Vatican, asking
him to convey to Roosevelt the Pope's desire to insist upon
religious freedom in Russia as a prerequisite to U.S.
recognition. Spellman appears to have communicated the
Pope's wishes through FDR's son James. [9]
When Litvinov finally arrived in Washington for the
talks which would lead to U.S. recognition, he was surprised
by the President's insistence on including the issue of
religious freedom in the discussions. Years later, in 1938,
Spellman recounted in a letter to his brother the
astonishment Litvinov expressed to William Bullitt.
According to Bullitt, after three days of talks Litvinov
exclaimed "I can't understand the President; he hasn't
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ns . "
talked about anything but religious freedom to me, and I
want to talk about important things like trade relatio
[10]
After nine days of discussions FDR and Litvinov
exchanged formal notes which extended recognition to the
Soviet Union. In the notes the Soviets agreed to cease
subversive activity in the United States, to permit American
citizens in the Soviet Union free exercise of religion and
to negotiate a final settlement on financial claims. The
agreement seems to bear the imprint of Secretary Hull's
position in that it recognized the right of Americans to
worship freely in Russia. At the same time the agreement
seems to have satisfied American Catholics. Monsignor Keegan
of New York congratulated Roosevelt on the manner in which
he upheld "the vitally sacred principles which we Americans
hold so dear." Bishop Spellman recorded in his diary, "Jack
Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear in
history did much to get President Roosevelt to insist that
American citizens at least should worship God as they wished
in Russia." [11]
The resolution of the recognition of Russia question
established a precedent which would play an important part
in the future relationship between FDR and American
Catholics. First, Catholics did not get exactly what they
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wanted. They had sought virtual total recognition of freedom
of religion in Russia. The recognition agreement provided
only for the right of Americans in Russia to worship freely,
which amounted to the right of the embassy staff to worship,
as there were virtually no other Americans in Russia. At the
same time the President did raise the issue of religious
freedom repeatedly and vigorously, as testified to by the
comments of William Bullitt. The fact that FDR even took
into account Catholic sensitivities was a major departure
from previous American administrations. His ability to reach
a compromise they found acceptable would become a feature of
his administration. Finally, the issue of religious freedom
in the Soviet Union would continue to be a central feature
of Roosevelt's future dealings with the Soviet Union, and an
important element of his thinking on the future postwar
settlement
.
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CHAPTER 3
"MARX AMONG THE AZTECS"
As the issue of Russian recognition was being
favorably resolved for the President another, raore
perplexing problem arose which would haunt the
administration throughout FDR's first term. American
Catholics had been concerned about the fate of their
co-religionists in Mexico since 1913. The Church in Mexico
was closely aligned with the regime which was overthrown i
the revolution that year. The new revolutionary government
wrote a constitution in 1917 containing several
anti-Catholic provisions. The hostility of the Mexican
government expressed itself in repeated instances of
anticlericalism. Several priests were murdered and churche
burned
.
The election of General Plutarco Elias Calles as
President intensified the problem, and injected the issue
anti-communism into the fray. Calles was arguably the most
radical in a series of revolutionary Mexican Presidents. A
true believer in the social and economic aspects of the
Mexican Revolution in 1925 he called for enactment of new
laws to enforce the land reform provisions of the 1917
constitution. One such law allowed foreigners to purchase
land, but only if they renounced all rights of protection
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their own government. The second law, called the petrol
law, declared subsoil deposits, such as oil, were the
"inalienable and ^prescribable " property of the nation.
Several American oil companies, used to having their own way
in Mexico, refused to comply with the new laws. Calls for
American military intervention in Mexico increased, and the
press picked up on the charges of the need to prevent the
spread of bolshevism. The oil companies argued that Mexico
was going the way of the Soviet Union, and would soon
provide a base for the spread of communism throughout Latin
America
.
American Catholics were just as upset as the American
oil companies. Calles began enforcing the anti-Catholic
provisions of the 1917 constitution which were largely
ignored by his predecessors Carranza and Obregon:
nationalizing church property, expelling foreign priests and
nuns, prohibiting religious instruction in private primary
schools and limiting the number of priests allowed to
perform religious functions in the various Mexican states.
Wh en Calles refused to compromise on these issues the Pope
took the extraordinary measure of authorizing an interdict
against Mexico, prohibiting the performance of public
religious rites .
When FDR took office in March 1933, he appointed his
old friend and boss from his days in the Navy Department,
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Josephus Daniels, Ambassador to Mexico. The appointment was
initially well received by both the Catholic press and
spokesmen who viewed the appointment of such a close friend
as an indication that FDR would use the ambassador to exert
his influence in Mexican affairs. In late July 1934, Daniels
gave a speech in Mexico City, before a seminar on education,
in which he quoted from President Calles on the importance
of education in Mexico's future: "We must enter and take
possession of the mind of childhood, the mind of youth." To
this Daniels added his own thoughts: "To the carrying out of
that aim, which alone can give Mexico the high place
envisioned by its statesmen, the government is making the
rural school a social institution." [1]
What Daniels thought an innocent phrase comparing
Mexican efforts in education to the widely respected
American public school system provoked a furor among
American Catholics. Many immediately called for his
resignation. Father Coughlin told his huge radio audience
that the U.S. government "from Wilson down to our President
Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of Mexico." The
issue was quickly transformed from a question of the rights
of private schools to the question of whether Mexico was
following in the footsteps of Russian communism. The issue
would not go away, and in November, Common we al . in an
editorial entitled "Mexico follows Russia," stated that "The
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ruling powers of Mexico are seemingly determined to follow
Russia's example to the last and most bitter degree." The
editors argued that Americans were witnessing just across
the border "a full demonstration of the most
anti-democratic, anti-libertarian, anti-religious tyranny
known in the modern world outside Russia itself." [2]
Unlike the recognition of Russia question, which
centered almost exclusively around the official position of
the church hierarchy, Catholic lay organizations became
actively involved in the Mexican issue. In New York,
Catholic students picketed the Mexican consulate. The
Catholic Evidence Guild, Ancient Order of Hibernians,
Catholic Daughters of America, Holy Name Societies, the
National Council of Catholic Women and even the
Massachusetts League of Catholic Foresters sent letters to
the White House. The group which took the lead in
criticizing the President, however, and which refused to let
go of the issue, was the Knights of Columbus. [3]
Throughout 1934, 1935, and into the election year of
1936 the 500,000 member organization kept up a steady stream
of criticism of the Roosevelt administration. Michael H.
Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut, head of the organization,
requested a meeting with FDR in January of 1935 to discuss
the Mexican situation. The President instead arranged for
Carmody, and the executive committee of the Knights, to meet
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with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Following the meeting
with Hull the group termed the discussion "very
satisfactory", but continued to lobby influential Catholic
members of congress. Through the efforts of Senator David
Walsh, from Carmody's neighboring state of Massachusetts,
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho introduced a resolution in
the Senate calling for an investigation "Into the
persecution of Christians... now being practiced in Mexico,"
and for senate resolutions protesting the "anti-religious
campaign" being conducted in Mexico. [4]
Catholic newspapers editorialized in favor of passage
of the Borah resolution, and several prominent members of
the Catholic hierarchy spoke out in favor of it. In an
editorial of February 15, 1935, CcjoiojiweaL acknowledged that
the Borah Resolution was not expected to pass. But the
editors took issue with the Protestant periodical The
Christian Century, which had criticized the role of the
Catholic Church in Mexico, claiming the church had
"underwritten a blanket denunciation of socialism and
socialistic education." Commonweal's editors argued that a
"common-sense" distinction had to be made "between the
'socialism' of social reformers and the 'socialism of say,
Marx, Lenin, Bakunin and their modern exemplars in Russia
and Mexico." [5]
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Only a week earlier, on February 8, 1935, Co mmon „Pfl i
carried an article by William T. Walsh entitled "Is
Communism Dangerous" in which he compared General Calles to
Stalin and criticized Daniels for his public praise "...in
favor of a Communistic plan to transfer all control of
children's education form the parent to the state." But,
perhaps even more ominously for FDR
, Walsh quoted an article
in the Saturday Review to the effect that "collectivism in
some form is inevitable
.. .sovietis., fascism and President
Roosevelt's 'New Deal' will be found in the long run,
despite apparent divergencies, to have been fundamentally
the same thing." Not only were readers being asked to equate
Mexico's revolution with Soviet Russia, but also to equate
Roosevelt's New Deal with soviet style collect! vism
.
[ 6
]
The administration took the position that the Borah
Resolution represented "a premature indictment of a friendly
neighboring government," and would hinder the development of
the President's Good Neighbor policy. Nonetheless a petition
in the House garnered 242 signatures which was presented to
Roosevelt. The President needed to say something and put the
issue behind him. A second request for a meeting with the
President was sent by Carmody in April, and again was
referred to the State Department. This time, however, FDR
requested a reply be prepared that could be sent over his
signature. Commonweal returned to the issue that same month
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with an article entitled "Marx Among the Aztecs." The
author, Dixon Wecter, equated Mexican and Russian socialism
and collectivism, and reminded readers that "In 1927
Secretary Kellogg sought to convince the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate that Communism was receiving
official encouragement in Mexico." Official encouragement?
Was Wecter implying that FDR was encouraging communism in
one of our closest neighboring states? The evidence seems to
suggest that this is precisely what was happening. The
association with New Deal social programs promoting
collectivism
,
reluctance to challenge the Mexican
government and the Russian recognition issue were leading
many Americans, both Catholic and non-Catholics alike to the
conclusion FDR's sympathies lay with some foreign ideology.
In May Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, expressed
this concern in a letter to Roosevelt asking him to take a
strong public stand on the religious freedom issue and "end
rumors of Roosevelt sympathy for communism ."[ 7
]
Finally, in early July, the President met with Carmody
and a delegation from the Knights of Columbus. The group
again asked the President to speak out publicly against the
persecution of the church in Mexico. FDR, however, would
give the group no specific promise. After the meeting, the
Knights told the press he had been gracious but
noncommittal. Eight days later the President met with a
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Congressional delegation on the same subject, and used the
opportunity to issue a statement on religious freedom which
said he wished to "make it clear that the American people
and the Government believed in freedom of religious worship
not only in the United States, but also in other nations."
C8]
The Catholic press seemed relieved by the statement.
Most took the position that Roosevelt had spoken directly to
the Mexican situation, although he had not mentioned Mexico.
Commonweal praised the statement as the forerunner of an
international pact on religious freedom. The Catholic
journal America editorialized that "a major objective of our
campaign on Mexico was achieved." It seemed as though a
collective sigh of relief was taken by Catholic opinion
leaders. The President had said something-anything-and they
could now return to cementing relations with a President
they believed was taking a genuine interest in Catholic
issues .
It seemed the President had put the issue to rest.
However, the Knights of Columbus were not so easily
mollified. At their annual convention at New York in August
the Knights passed a unanimous resolution authorizing
Carmody to send yet another letter to the President
expressing their regret at the President's apparent lack of
concern over matters in Mexico. In October, the National
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Board of Directors sent a vigorous letter of protest to FDR
arguing that the President's statement on religious freedo*
fell far short of what was needed. The letter concluded,
"You cannot escape responsibility for throttling the Borah
Resolution... for the endorsement given the Mexican
Government.
.
.by your ambassador
... for nonaction on behalf of
bleeding
.. .Mexico . " [9]
This time the Knights had gone too far. The political
activism generated by the Mexican situation was calling into
question who had the authority to speak for the church.
Archbishop John J. McNicholas of Cincinnati issued a
statement to be read in all churches of his archdiocese
stating that the Knights "in no sense speak for the priest-
hood or for the Catholic laity of Cincinnati." McNicholas
was correct in stating that the Knights did not speak for
the entire Catholic community. The anti -communist rhetoric
which dominated much of the issue surrounding education in
Mexico would now be brought to a close with a symbolic
gesture from American Catholic education. Chicago's liberal
Cardinal George Mundelein would play a key role in bringing
the clamor created by the Knights latest letter to an
end. [10]
In November of 1935, the University of Notre Dame, the
most prestigious Catholic university in the country, invited
Roosevelt to receive an honorary degree. Frank Walker, Mayor
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of Detroit and a close political advisor to FDR
, and a Notre
Dame graduate, appears to have been closely involved with
the decision to present the degree to the President in the
midst of the swirling controversy over the Knight's letter.
Notre Dame president John O'Hara was delighted with the
prospect, and traveled to Washington to complete the
arrangements. Cardinal Mundelein presided at the
presentation at South Bend on December 9, and said his
presence was to insure the President he was "among friends."
The Cardinal, in a direct reference to the Knight's
controversy, said no one group had the right to claim to
speak for all Catholics. Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes confided to his diary that the Cardinal's speech
amounted to "a pretty complete endorsement of the
President." For his part FDR gave a ringing endorsement of
the concepts of "Freedom of education and freedom of
religious worship" as a necessity for "true national life."
The sight of the President receiving an honorary degree from
Notre Dame from a Cardinal of the church would surely put to
rest the idea that the President was secretly encouraging
the spread of communism. FDR was thus able to move into the
election year of 1936 with what Arthur Krock of The New York
Times described as a Catholic endorsement of the President.
But 1936 would bring the President into yet more controversy
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with American Catholics, and again the issue would be
communism, at home and abroad. [11]
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CHAPTER 4
A COMMUNIST IN WASHINGTON'S CHAIR
The 1936 Presidential campaign began in earnest in
January when Al Smith addressed a glittering gathering of
the nation's wealthy at Washington's Mayflower Hotel. The
sponsor of the evening was the American Liberty League, a
self-proclaimed nonpartisan political group organized in
1934. The organization's principal sponsors, however,
included business and industrial leaders including Irenee Du
Pont, John J. Raskob, William S. Knudsen and J. Howard Pew.
The Liberty League was opposed to virtually every aspect of
Roosevelt's New Deal, viewing it as "creeping socialism" at
best and outright communism at worst. The League managed to
recruit both Smith and 1924 Democratic presidential
candidate John W. Davis as their spokesmen hoping that
having two former Democratic presidential candidates telling
the nation that the New Deal was a betrayal of American
principles would cause a split in the party and possibly
deny FDR the 1936 nomination.
A national radio audience heard the onetime "Happy
Warrior" of the Democratic Party denounce the inflationary
spending policies of the administration, call for a return
to the principles of state's rights and the need to honor
the constitution. Smith said the choice was clear; America
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had to choose between
"Washington and Moscow, the pure air
of Africa or the foul breath of co„unistic Russia... the
stars and stripes or the red flag of the godless ... Soviets .
»
Smith said the President himself was not a communist or a
socialist, but was being misled by those around him. [1]
Jim Farley, again heading the president's campaign,
claimed Smith had made a major mistake aligning himself with
the very elements which had fought against his run for the
presidency four years earlier. Farley believed Smith had
alienated himself from the very working-class constituency
which once formed the basis of his strength within the
party
.
While Smith, the only Catholic ever nominated by a
major party to run for president, had broken with FDR over
the New Deal early on, another important former Catholic
supporter would soon do the same. Father Coughlin was
becoming more critical of FDR with each passing week.
Farley, fearful of the priest's growing political strength,
attempted to reconcile the two. He arranged a meeting in
early January, but other than inquiring about the health of
their respective dogs, nothing was settled. Shortly after
praising the President's State of the Union address the
radio priest made his final break with FDR, charging that
the President's Brain Trust was communist infiltrated,
virtually the same thing Smith was saying. He apologized to
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hi, radio audience for his earlier support of FDR and told
the* "The slogan 'Roosevelt or Ruin' must now be altered to
read 'Roosevelt and Ruin. ' "[2]
The Catholic endorsement of Roosevelt proclaimed by
Harold Ickes and Arthur Krock the previous November now
seemed in doubt. Two of the most popular Catholics in the
country were both accusing Roosevelt of leading the nation
down the road to communism. How would the President respond
to this new challenge?
Farley made the decision to take on the Liberty League
in a direct confrontation in the Spring state primaries. The
League was boasting of its strength in New York, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland,
Ohio, Pennsylvania and Minnesota. Although well financed,
the League was an easy target for Farley and the party
bosses that remained loyal to FDR. He concentrated on the
nature of partisan selfishness expressed by the League and
its attempt to set class against class. According to Farley,
"The American people resented the idea of a league formed by
organized wealth to further its own political interests,
regardless of what happened to other classes in the nation."
[3]
The Spring primaries which demolished the hopes of the
Liberty League created a more disturbing problem. Father
Coughlin had turned his National Union for Social Justice,
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which he claimed had more than five million members nation-
wide, into a political movement. Coughlin announced the
Union would endorse congressional candidates that espoused
its principles. In Pennsylvania Coughlin endorsed twenty
Democrats and twelve Republicans. Twelve of them won,
including Representative Michael J. Stack in Philadelphia,
who was opposed by the local Kelley machine. However, ten of
the twelve were incumbents, and with the economy beginning
to show signs of recovery, incumbency was a strong position
to hold for congressional races. In Ohio, the radio priest
endorsed seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans.
Fifteen of the candidates won, and the Cleveland Democratic
machine was defeated along with two incumbents. Coughlin
claimed similar victories in Wisconsin, Massachusetts,
Michigan and Maine. While a Coughlin endorsement did not
seem to guarantee victory both parties were surprised at his
apparent ability to translate his public popularity into
votes. [ 4 ]
By the summer of 1936 Coughlin had allied his National
Union for Social Justice with the remains of Huey Long's
Share Our Wealth Society, under the leadership of the
Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith; Dr. Francis E. Townsend of
California, the spokesman for a movement advocating monthly
old age pensions; and Congressman William Lempke, spokesman
of neopopulist plains state farmers. Lempke would be the
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candidate of the Union Party, as the new organization was
called. But the real threat to Roosevelt, if there was one,
lay in the possibility that Coughlin could translate his
huge radio audience into a national voting block. On June
19, Coughlin announced the formation of the new party and
his support of Lempke for President on a special nationwide
broadcast. Claiming a "new day for America" Coughlin called
on "agriculture, labor, the disappointed Republicans and the
outraged Democrats" to join the new party and help "avoid
the treacherous pitfalls of red communism." [5]
In early August the followers of Dr. Townsend convened
for their convention. Reverend Smith spoke to the delegates
in a speech that was to set the tone for the upcoming
campaign. The country was faced with a choice "in the
presence of atheistic Communistic inf luence . . . It is the
Russian primer or the Holy bible... the Red flag or the Stars
and Stripes
... Lenin or Lincoln ... Stalin or Jefferson." H.L.
Mencken said he had never heard a more effective speech. The
next speaker, Father Coughlin, was not about to be upstaged.
He told the crowd that FDR stood for "Franklin
Double-crossing Roosevelt," a charge which drew both cheers
and boos from the audience. The Sargent-at-Arms called for
arder, and Dr Townsend asked that the "booers" be put out.
Coughlin resumed by asking the crowd why the American
Communist Party was supporting Roosevelt for President.
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Ripping off his Roman collar, he called FDR a "liar" and a
"betrayer." [6]
Church leaders were taken aback by the ferocity of
Coughlin's attack on the President. His immediate superior,
Bishop Michael Gallagher of Detroit, was about to leave for
Rome and discussions with Pius XI. Questioned about
Coughlin's speech, Gallagher said he did "not approve of the
language Father Coughlin had used in expressing himself on
the President." The bishop said he did not believe Roosevelt
was a Communist and that disagreement over policy was not a
reason to call a man a "liar." However, Gallagher said he
could not censure Coughlin and he would not be discussing
the priest with Vatican officials "unless they speak of it."
[7]
The Vatican would indeed "speak of it" when Gallagher
arrived in Rome. While Gallagher and his traveling
companion, Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland, were en
route to Rome the Vatican released a statement saying that
Coughlin's characterization of Roosevelt as a liar was a
"painful expression." Coughlin took the opportunity to
publish an apology to the President in the form of an open
letter to FDR in his newspaper Social Justice. Coughlin said
"in the heat of civic interest in righteous anger. ..I
used the word 'liar.' I now offer the President my sincerest
apology. "[8
]
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On arriving in Rome Gallagher and Schrembs denied
rumors that Gallagher had been called to Rome specifically
to discuss Coughlin and went so far as to defend Coughlin's
"fight for the preservation of American democracy." The
bishops would quickly change their tune. After meeting with
Vatican officials, including Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzard, the
Pope's closest political advisor, Gallagher announced that
he "personally, would favor Mr. Roosevelt more than any
other candidate at present," and that he and Schrembs "have
been advised to cease talking about Father Coughlin." [9]
Coughlin did not appear ready to compromise. Taking to
the campaign trail in early August he continued to hammer at
FDR, now referring to him as a "scab" President leading a
"scab army" of reliefers. Coughlin claimed the New Deal was
"surrounded by red and pink Communists and by 'frankfurters'
of destruction," a pointed reference to Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter, appointed by Roosevelt. He became
threatening in Providence, R.I., claiming there "would be
more bullets in the White House than you could count with an
adding machine" if FDR were reelected. In New Bedford, Ma.
he told an audience of 12,000 that he had been instrumental
in removing Herbert Hoover from the White House and "I will
be instrumental in taking a Communist from the chair once
occupied by Washington." [10]
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Returning to Cleveland for the national convention of
his National Union for Sooial Justice in mid-August, both he
and Smith returned to the familiar theme of Roosevelt and
communism. Smith gave one r, fof the most dramatic speeches of
his career. The New Deal was led hv .14by a slimy group of men
culled from the pink campuses of America with friendly gaze
fixed on Russia.
..and the had the face to recognize Russia,
where two million Christians had been butchered." Smith
concluded to a roar when he announced that the election was
really meaningless to him: "My real mission is to see that
the red flag of bloody Russia is not hoisted in place of the
Stars and Stripes." [11]
Coughlin appeared angered at the enthusiastic response
given Smith's speech by his National Union members. But his
flair for the dramatic would once again come to his rescue
in his battle of one-upsmanship with Smith. Speaking under a
hot sun the following day Coughlin told his followers that
both Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell, a key Roosevelt advisor,
were "communistic." Referring to the campaign as a "war" he
advised the National Union members "to go to your homes as
to a trench." He then collapsed and was assisted from the
stage. He was treated for a mild case of exhaustion and
advised to rest. [12]
The political threat that Coughlin and the Union Party
presented to FDR was beginning to take a back seat to the
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threat to the church presented by his activities. The
specter of a revived an t i
-C a t ho 1 i c i s . which had dominated
Presidential politics as recently as the 1928 campaign be g an
to surface. A faculty member of the Concordia Lutheran
Theological Seminary stated publicly that "the voice behind
that radio priest is the voice of his church." At the same
ti-e the New Republic, a liberal periodical, reported that
"the Union Party marks the deliberate entrance of the Roman
Catholic Church into national politics," and suggested that
the Vatican was backing Coughlin because it was depending on
the financial support of "wealthy American Catholic
families," and that "influential and wealthy Americans such
as Al Smith and John J. Raskob, think he can help defeat
Roosevelt." [13]
Both the Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy
were concerned with distancing themselves from Coughlin and
assuring all Americans that his views were not those of the
church. On September 2, Osservatore Roman* criticized
priests who challenged the constituted authorities in the
countries in which they lived, and pointed out Coughlin's
attacks on the President as an example. The article also
took issue with Bishop Gallagher for stating that the
Vatican approved of Coughlin's activities. Both Coughlin and
the press were on hand when Gallagher's ship returned from
Rome. Seemingly overwhelmed by Coughlin's presence the
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bishop was quoted as sayine " T f ' c/ 6 lt s the voice of God that
co.es to you from the great orator fro. Royal Oak. Rally
round it." The bishop denied the report in Osserv.t^
RomajrwLwas accurate. Coughlin was overjoyed with this
seeming endorsement, but then was shocked to hear Gallagher
claim that Roosevelt was the b e s t -q ual i f i ed candidate for
the presidency. When asked about the Osservatore editorial
Coughlin claimed it was only "one newspaper's opinion." The
Vatican then took the unusual step of sending a note to all
press organizations confirming that the Osservatore
editorial represented the official Vatican position on this
issue
.[ 14 ]
Just how much of a political threat the Union Party
represented to FDR is an open question. The President was at
the height of his popularity despite the sniping and
accusations of communist sympathies. Publicly, Farley
dismissed the third party movement, privately he was taking
no chances. He was continually monitoring the Union Party
strength through his vast network of personal contacts,
party workers and even postal authorities. FDR had
instructed Farley to monitor postal receipts for Royal Oak
to keep tabs on the priest's popularity. Several states were
reporting great strength among Coughlin supporters. Both the
nation's conservative and liberal press were taking the new
party seriously. The conservative Los Angeles Times
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suggested that "Lemuke'Q f^^ „PK s thlr d Party may defeat Roosevelt."
The liberal New Rep ublic, editorialized "this party is far
*ore formidable than Al Smith's Liberty League.... It might
Prove that the New Deal has not been radical enough to
satisfy popular discontent." The Minneapolis TrU„ na
suggested that Lempke's popularity in the farm states would
challenge FDR's earlier vote. A New York Ti,»c survey
revealed Townsend's popularity in Washington, Oregon and
California would disrupt traditional Democratic and
Republican voting patterns. [15]
Unquestionably, Coughlin's strength rested with
Catholic voters. Massachusetts political leaders were
virtually unanimous in their fear of Coughlin's support.
Governor James Curley, Congressman John McCorraack and
Senator David Walsh all reported to Farley that Coughlin's
popularity would translate into a large Lempke vote. The
President's son, James Roosevelt, claimed Coughlin was
"stronger in Massachusetts than in any other state." Farley
disagreed, stating that Ohio was the strongest Coughlin
state. Reports were coming in almost daily of the threat
Coughlin forces represented in Cleveland, where Coughlin's
endorsement in the Spring primaries had been attributed to
defeating the local machine candidate. The priest was demon-
strating great influence among both German and Irish
Catholics. One party worker claimed: "I am not
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anti-Catholic,
...but g0 into any Catholic settlement in
Northwestern Ohio and you will Ei „d a lot of strong Le.pfce
sentiment and following." [16]
Farley was undoubtedly ready to call in all the
political lOU's. Catholics had been one of the groups to
benefit most from FDR's patronage. The percentage of
Catholics appointed to the federal judicxary increased from
four percent during the combined administrations of Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge and Hoover to 29 percent under Roosevelt.
Many prominent Catholic politicians were calling on the
American Church to take a public position against Coughlin.
Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx was reported to have threatened
to leave the church if the clergy did not repudiate the
priest. Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Frank Murphy, Governor of Michigan
and a former close friend of Coughlin, were assigned to work
against the priest among Catholic laymen. [17]
While Catholic politicians and laymen were busy solid-
ifying FDR's position among Catholic voters the clergy was
no less active in making its position known. In July,
shortly after Coughlin's opening attack on the President,
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University wrote to
Roosevelt informing him that his "friends are not ignoring
the calumnies of Father Coughlin." Sheehy told FDR of a
meeting he had attended in New York attended by four bishops
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and three monsignori at which Coughlin's attacks on the
President had been the topic of discussion. The result was
,
Plan on "how this matter might be handled most effectively
and we have taken action." [18]
Although Sheehy's letter to FDR did not outline the
Plan of action discussed at New York it soon became clear
that the Church hierarchy intended to refute Coughlin at
every turn, and disociate his campaign rhetoric from any
official sanction by the church. Coughlin continued to
attack the President as a "communist" and the New Deal as a
communist-inspired program developed by the President's
advisors. He told the public that in voting for Roosevelt
"We are voting for the Communists, the socialists, the
Russian lovers, the Mexican lovers and the Kick-me-downers .
"
Before a crowd estimated at 100,000 in Chicago he decried
the "Commies" in the administration: "Rexie Tugwell
. . . hand
shaker of Russia, plow-me-down Wallace, .. .Josephus Daniels -
the man who applauds the slaughter of priests and nuns in
Mexico." He was raising again all the issues associated by
Catholics with communist influence in the years of the
Roosevelt administration
.[ 19
]
But now his remarks were not going unchallenged. When
Coughlin gave a speech in Cincinnati in which he declared
Roosevelt a "dictator" and said it might become necessary to
use "bullets" instead of "ballots" Archbishop McNicholas
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responded that he "cannot let pass the advocacy of the use
of bullets and I condemn such remarks." South Dakota's
Bishop Bernard Mahoney publicly called Cou S hll„ a "Cultural
vulgarian," and Boston's Cardinal Williaa, O'Connell spoke
out against him. [20]
In early October the anti-Coughlin campaigns of the
Catholic politicians and the Catholic clergy converged.
Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming reached Monsignor John
Ryan of Catholic University with a request that Ryan make a
radio speech rebutting Coughlin's charges of communists in
Washington. Ryan agreed to make the speech and submitted
several drafts to O'Mahoney. FDR himself seems to have had
some input into the speech. An early draft, with a specific
reference to Coughlin was edited to delete his name, then it
was put back in "reportedly at the direction of the
President
.
[21
]
Ryan went on the air on October 8, addressing himself
to "the wage earners" and "toilers" who had suffered most
from the depression and benefited most from the New Deal.
This category of course contained the great bulk of working
class Catholics who had made up the great waves of
immigration concentrated in America's urban areas. Ryan
dismissed Coughlin's charges that FDR and his advisors such
as Felix Frankfurter and Rexford Tugwell were communists.
Ryan charged that Coughlin's explanation of what was wrong
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with the American economy were »a+ * ny t least 50 percent wrong"
and his solutions "at lea^t- on ~ast 90 percent wrong." He concluded
by begging "the toilers of America" not- f n all ,t to abandon Roosevelt
in the coming election. [22]
The Vatican now stepped into the picture. On September
30 it was announced that Cardinal Secretary of State Eugenio
Pacelli would visit the United States for a three week
"vacation." The American hierarchy was taken completely off
guard by the announcement, with the exception of Boston's
Auxiliary Bishop Frances Spellman, who was secretly notified
of the visit in August. The bishop confided to his diary his
reservations about the second most powerful prelate in the
Vatican visiting the United States in the midst of a heated
election in which Catholics were playing such a prominent
role. Spellman realized, or knew, that this visit would not
be confined to a simple "vacation." A nationwide tour for
the Cardinal was organized. Pacelli spent four relatively
quiet days at a secluded Long Island estate before embarking
on a trip that took him to Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia,
Washington, Chicago, St. Paul, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
St. Louis, Cincinnati and back to New York. Pointedly
omitted from the Cardinal's itinerary was the Diocese of
Detroit, Father Coughlin's home base. [23]
Bishop Gallagher was angered at the snub, and traveled
to Cincinnati along with his friend Bishop Schrembs of
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Cleveland seeking to meet with Pacelli. Although the two
arrived early in the morning they were informed that the
Cardinal was already in a meeting with McNicholas. The two
bishops were left to cool their heels most of the day and
then informed the Cardinal would not grant them an audience.
The next day, however, Gallagher was informed by Pacelli "to
exercise more control over Father Coughlin and to inform him
that he was not to participate in political campaigning once
the 1936 election was over." Gallagher seems to have
finally gotten the message. On October 30, with Pacelli
still in the country, Gallagher forced Coughlin to make a
public apology for calling Roosevelt a "scab President." He
also implied that Coughlin would no longer be allowed to
participate in politics after the election, something which
Coughlin later confirmed. [24]
When the votes were counted, Roosevelt won an
overwhelming victory. The President carried 46 states with a
popular vote plurality of over 11 million votes. Coughlin's
Union Party had not been a factor in the outcome. The
evidence seems clear that Farley had pulled out all the
stops to keep Catholic voters from deserting FDR in favor of
the popular Coughlin and had succeeded dramatically.
Election analysts agreed that Catholics voted for Roosevelt
in huge numbers. They disagreed only on the exact magnitude
of the percentage that voted for FDR. George Gallop
65
estimated the Catholic vote for Roosevelt at over 70
Percent. R.M. Darrow said of Catholics voting over 80
percent voted for FDR. [25]
In the midst of Pacelli's whirlwind tour of the
country Spellman noted in his diary on October 24: "Joe
Kennedy arranged for President to invite Cardinal to lunch
with him on November 5th and so told me, but I said to have
Cardinal invited directly and through neither of us." The
day after the election Roosevelt met with Cardinal Pacelli
at his home at Hyde Park. The guest list for the
post-election day luncheon hosted by the President's mother,
Sara Delano Roosevelt, was surprisingly limited; the
President, Cardinal Pacelli, Bishop Spellman, Bishop Stephen
J. Donahue representing Cardinal Hayes of New York, Count
Galeazzi, Joseph P. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy and Frank C.
Walker and Mrs. Walker. In a letter to his brother Bishop
Spellman said such a meeting "before the Presidency of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would have been considered
fantastic." The President elect and the Cardinal sat before
the fireplace and discussed a wide range of topics. "This
was a great day for America and for Catholic America,"
Spellman concluded. [26]
Little else is known of the events of that day, or of
what the President and the future Pope talked about in front
of the fireplace. A crowd of reporters gathered outside the
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President's home waiting for the Cardinal to emerge. They
speculated that the two men discussed Communism, Father
Coughlin, and the possibility the President would recognize
the Vatican: sending an envoy to the Pope. Their hopes for a
quote on any of these matters were dashed when the Cardinal
emerged. The following day The New m.w Tj^s reported that
Pacelli left the meeting with FDR and greeted the waiting
correspondents. However, attempts to question the Cardinal
"were stopped before a single question could be completed."
The Cardinal's escort, Bishop Spellman, "declared that the
Cardinal had given no interview and should give none now."
Despite efforts to convince the Cardinal that questions he
did not want to answer would be considered "as not having
been put" Bishop Spellman "firmly declined." [27]
The lesson of the day was not lost on either the press
or President Roosevelt: Bishop Spellman carried great weight
with Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli. This would become
increasingly clear in future years as FDR relied on Spellman
as a private channel of communication to the Vatican,
circumventing normal diplomatic channels such as the
Apostolic Delegate in Washington and other, higher ranking
members of the American Catholic hierarchy. It was just such
a message which Spellman sent to Pius XII outlining FDR's
postwar plans in late 1943.
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Although Roosevelt was overwhelmingly reelected and
the Union Party crushed in the 1936 election it would be a
mistake to view the election results as a complete
repudiation of Coughlin. Analysts have correctly pointed out
that the Union Party faced more than the usual obstacles
Placed in the path of American third-party movements. There
was never a real political organization associated with the
Union Party: no cadres to get out the vote, no workers to
canvass and identify potential votes. Both Coughlin and
Smith used the party to advance their own personal agenda
rather than attempting to foster a new political movement.
The party managed to get on the ballot in only 36 states,
and in six of those states the party label did not appear on
the ballot. As the campaign progressed the dissension within
the party became evident until even Dr. Townsend recognized
the problem and switched his support to Landon. Voters were
faced with the usual third-party dilemma, would their vote
be wasted? All these problems contributed to the crushing
defeat suffered by the Union Party.
There is no measure to determine how much of the
public believed the charges of communist influence within
the New Deal or the accusation that FDR himself was a
communist. But the charge hung in the air, and although
Coughlin was under orders not to become actively involved in
politics again he was not under orders to stay off the air
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with his radi0 show. He would continue to be a thorn in the
side of Roosevelt and his radio program would continue to
draw huge audiences. The issue of communis* would not go
away. And for Catholics the issue would become more critical
very soon.
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CHAPTER 5
"...THE LOSS OF EVERY CATHOLIC VOTE... H
The President barely had time to celebrate his
reelection before Catholic anti
-communism was once again
thrust into his decision-making process. Events at home and
abroad were again beginning to focus around the fear of the
spread of international communism, and around charges that
FDR was fostering communism within the U.S.
In July of 1936 General Francisco Franco led a revolt
of the Spanish army against the democratically elected
Popular Front government, which included elements of the
Spanish Communist Party. The Popular Front received only 46
percent of the votes cast in the Spanish elections. However,
the proportional representation used to allocate seats in
the Diet resulted in the Front receiving almost two thirds
of the seats. The anti-Catholic sentiments of the extreme
left within the Front quickly manifested itself in
widespread incidents of anti-clericalism: churches were
burned, religious education attacked, and priests, bishops
and nuns murdered. Catholics argued that Franco's revolt
was based on the fact that the democratic elements within
the coalition had "succumbed to the extreme Leftist groups"
and was founded "on the legitimate ground that the
government had betrayed the electorate ."[1
]
72
Franco's revolt was widely viewed as the latest
n.nifeatation of European F,aci sra challenging the rule of
democracy. Therein lay the problem lor African Catholics.
Commonweal opened the new year with an editorial on January
I taking issue with Its Protestant counterpart, TJls.
chr i st i an Crnrury
,
which had editorialized in utt 1936 that
the Catholic Church was conducting
, world-wide campaign
against Communism because "The Holy See is really concerned
with supporting Fasci am
,
- w 1 t h its inevitable accompaniments
of autocracy and brutality, and lor the special privileges
which the Roman Catholic Church Is able to enjoy under
Fascist governments.'" The editors of Commonweal to.,nH thia
charge incredible, and pointed to the opinion of the editor
of Per AnEr i ff , Joseph Goebbels, who charged that Cardinal
Pacelli's visit to the United States was part o 1 a plan to
set up a "Catholic Center Party" in order to prevent the
spread of National Socialiat doctrine, and that FDR '
a
reelection was "one anointed by the Vatican." The Commonweal
editors doubted both views could be correct. I? |
The Church's condemnation of Communism was not
political, according to Com monweal . but religious. Communist
propaganda, as in Spain, embodied in the slogan "Join with
Communism against Fascism to save democracy" was a false
issue. The real issue was not between Communism and Fascism
but between "democracy and all forms of totalitarianism,
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including C,mis,. Fascisn
, „as noth . ng
^
reaction against Co,.„nis,, uithout Hhtch it could ^
exist. The editorial frampH fh<t ined t e issue for American Catholics
and would for, the basis of the Catholic approach to Spain
as long as the civil war went unresolved. More importantly,
the Catholic attitude would carry great weight with FDR
. [3]
Isolationist sympathies in the United States were
Sreatly strengthened following the revelations of the Nye
Committee in 1934. These hearings produced the 1935
Neutrality Act prohibiting U.S. arms manufacturers from
supplying belligerents in any foreign war. FDR attempted to
apply the act to the Spanish Civil War, but the act did not
mention civil wars, and U.S. arms manufacturers began to
make shipments to both sides. When the administration's
efforts at moral persuasion failed FDR asked for an
amendment to the 1937 renewal of the act that would include
civil wars and expand executive discretion in applying the
act. Congress willingly approved the inclusion of civil wars
in the act. The extension of executive powers was another
matter. [4]
FDR opened his second term with perhaps the most
serious political blunder of his years in office: his
attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Much of the congressional
debate surrounding 'the extension of executive powers sought
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by the President in the Neutrality Act revolved around his
attempt to assume
"dictatorial powers." Senator Hiram
Johnson, an ardent isolationist, said Roosevelt's attempt to
alter the nature of the court would lead to him making
himself "an absolute dictator in fact." The court fight
spilled over into the Neutrality Act fight over the question
of extension of executive powers. The nature of the Spanish
fight was also changing. In March Italian troops were
captured at Guadalajara proving the charges that Italy and
Germany were actively supporting the Franco "Nationalists."
C5]
As the civil war in Spain intensified, American
opinion on the Neutrality Act began to shift. The
Guadalajara incident shifted the argument from direct help
to the Loyalist government to imposition of the Neutrality
Act against Italy and Germany. At the same time the Vatican
was clarifying its position on the conflicting ideologies
involved in the struggle. In early March Pius XI issued back
to back encyclicals. The first, Mit Brenneder Soree . (With
Burning Sorrow) was an open attack on German National
Socialism. The encyclical charged the Nazi government with
violating the 1933 concordat concluded between the Reich and
the Vatican, and with sowing "suspicion, discord, hatred,
calumny" and "secret and open hostility to Christ and His
Church." The Pope attacked the racial and religious policies
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of the Third Reich and predicted "destructive reli gl0 us
wars.
..which have no other aim than ... extermination . - The
concordat of 1933 had been negotiated by Eugenic Pacelli,
then serving as Papal Nuncio in Germany. It guaranteed
freedom of the Catholic religion and the right of the Church
"to regulate her own affairs." The Reich broke the concordat
within five days of its signing. Thousands of priests and
lay leaders were arrested and confined to concentration
camps, church property was confiscated, Catholic
publications suppressed and the sanctity of the confessional
was violated by the Gestapo. [6]
The second encyclical, Divini Redemptoris
T attacked
"the principles of dialectical and historical materialism"
and condemned Communism as "intrinsically wrong, and no one
who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with
it in any undertaking whatsoever." This "plague on both your
houses" attitude of the Vatican may explain why American
Catholic opinion was split on the question of Spain. With
Communists on one side and Fascists on the other, Catholics
were being forced to choose between the lesser of two evils,
as Commonweal suggested. The American Catholic hierarchy,
however, had no difficulty in choosing sides. Increasingly,
the struggle in Spain was portrayed in terms of the
Communist faction within the Loyalist coalition. While the
Catholic press was highlighting the anti -clerical atrocities
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of the Loyalist government, bishops throu s hout the country
were associating the government's activities with the spread
of international Communism
.[ 7
]
In late April the bombing of Guernica thrust the
entire question of the embargo back into the spotlight. It
also exemplified the confusion surrounding the entire raa tter
for American Catholics. German made planes bombed the Basque
city for several hours leaving 1,654 people dead and another
889 wounded. Calls immediately went out for an embargo
against Germany and Italy. The Basque region was largely
Catholic, and the bombing should have outraged Catholic
opinion in America as it did the rest of the country. But
the Basques were fighting for the Loyalists, which meant the
communists. German planes being used to bomb Spanish
Catholics who were fighting for the communists? It was
enough to confuse any Catholic. [8]
In the meantime FDR finally worked out a compromise
with Senator Pittraan regarding the extension of the
Neutrality Act. The President was forced to accept less of
the discretionary power he first sought under the act in the
face of Pittman's objections to the expansion of
"dictatorial powers." On May 1, the permanent Neutrality Law
went into effect. Norman Thomas met with the President in
June after returning from Spain and observing the war first
hand. When Thomas raised the issue of the war in Spain and
77
the embargo the President told hi, his position "had been
and would be guided by what he thought was the attitude of
the Catholic Church in America." [9]
Was the President's position on Spain a payback for
the role the Catholic hierarchy played in the '36 election?
Catholic public opinion was, and would continue to be, split
on the question of what to do about Spain. The hierarchy of
the Church, however, was virtually unanimous. The debate
over the civil war in Spain would continue through the rest
of 1937 and 1938. FDR continued to refuse to apply the
embargo to Berlin and Rome, and to lift it against Spain. He
did this in spite of polls indicating the overwhelming
support such a move would have with the American people. A
Gallop Poll conducted in December of 1938 asked: "Which side
do you sympathize with in the Spanish Civil War?"
Nationally, 76 percent sympathized with the Loyalists, while
only 24 percent sympathized with Franco. When broken down by
religion, however, only 42 percent of Catholics sided with
the Loyalists, compared to 83 percent of Protestants. Franco
was favored by 58 percent of Catholics compared to only 17
percent of Pro test ants .[ 10
]
For FDR, however, the issue was framed in terms of the
opposition of the Catholic hierarchy. Clearly, Catholic lay
opinion on Spain was divided, as the poll indicated. As the
congressional elections in the fall of 1938 approached, FDR
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Put the matter in purely valHtH-.i *y poil lcal terms. Secretary of the
Interior Harold Ickes was furious when Roosevelt failed to
act on lifting the embargo against Spain. He recounts in his
diary how he overcame FDR's logistical objections to lifting
the arms ban only to have the President relate that he had
discussed the matter that morning with congressional leaders
and they feared that to raise the ban "would mean the loss
of every Catholic vote in the coming fall elections." The
Interior Secretary exclaimed in his diary "This proves up to
the hilt what so many people have been saying, namely, that
the Catholic minorities in Great Britain and America have
been dictating the international policy with respect to
Spain." [11]
Clearly, FDR's position was political, as any
President's would be. It was also consistent, as the two
conversations with Thomas and Ickes demonstrate. The thrust
of both conversations, coming over a year apart, indicate
that the President was unwilling to risk losing the Catholic
vote over the issue of Spain. They also demonstrate that his
fear was that the Catholic hierarchy's strong anti-communist
position on Spain was the deciding factor. The ability of
the hierarchy to offset Coughlin's influence in the '36
election was a lesson not lost in the White House. Some
historians argue that recollections of private conversations
with FDR cannot be taken at face value because he had a
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tendency to tell people what they wanted to hoar, and then
dtd what he wanted. Clearly, what FDR waa telling both
Tho.as and Ickea waa not what they wanted to hear, and what
he did was not what they wanted hi* to do, but rather what
he felt he needed to do.
* * * * *
While the controversy over lifting the arms embargo
against Spain was raging the question of communist influence
within the administration would not go away. Father Coughlin
briefly left the air following the 1936 election, as he said
he would if the Union Party was not victorious, but quickly
resumed his broadcasts and supervision of his Social J„ SHr,
newspaper. By July of 1937 Coughlin was again on the attack
against communists, this time within the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. He labeled the entire CIO as a
"Moscow tool teeming with communists" and charged they were
taking instructions from the "Communist Central Committee of
the United States." Earlier, Coughlin labeled CIO head John
L. Lewis a "labor dictator" and "a communist tool being used
to prepare the way for the eventual victory of Marxism in
the United States." [12]
With Coughlin back in stride questions began to
surface in places generally considered more congenial to the
President. Writing in Commonweal in September Oliver McKee,
Jr. denounced the "class prejudice" being fostered by the
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New Deal. McKee argued that FDR * s "political strategy and
many of his policies ha ve ... tended to incite class
Prejudice, and create in the public mind the impression that
Property is necessarily the foe of human rights." McKee does
not charge that FDR is a communist, or even being influenced
by communists, but the suggestion that the New Deal is
promoting class warfare and "appeals to class consciousness
to win popular support" demonstrate that even the liberal
Commonweal was beginning to question the aims of the New
Deal. [13]
In early 1938 Coughlin was again attracting
considerable attention, so much so that the Gallop Poll
conducted a survey in an attempt to gauge his strength. The
poll revealed that some 8.5 million American families with
radios listened to Coughlin either regularly or "from time
to time." This represented one-third of the 24 million
households with radios. More importantly, 83 percent of
those listening to Coughlin "approved" of what he said. The
survey was crude by today's standards, and did not break
down the audience by religion, income, region or other
indicators of where Coughlin's message was having an effect.
[14]
Clearly, large numbers of Americans were still
listening to Coughlin and agreeing with what he was saying.
At the time of the poll Coughlin's attacks on FDR and the
81
New Deal
„
ere beco.n, increasingly vitriolic. In October of
1937 Coughlin commented on the "personal stupidity of
President Roosevelt" in an interview while on the same day
an article in his S^cial^ustic^ d e c I a r e d that Catholics
could not belong to the CIO because "Catholicism was as
incompatible with the CIO as Catholicism was incompatible
with Mohammedanism." He now added a new aspect to his attack
on international communism, associating it with
"internationl Jewry." The pages of Social .!„H rP became
filled with anti-Semitic articles and pro-German sentiments
Placing him in direct opposition to the anti-Nazi position
asserted by Pius XI in his encyclical "Mit Brennenrier
Soree"
. [15]
The communist threat was everywhere according to
Coughlin: in labor unions, colleges, and the administration.
The political atmosphere, poisoned by Coughlin and others,
which continued to surround the inability of the New Deal to
bring the depression to an end manifested itself in the
summer of 1938. The House voted 181 to 41 for the creation
of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Ostensibly,
the committee was chartered to investigate extremist
political activity on both the left and right. However,
under the chairmanship of Martin Dies of Texas, the
committee focused almost exclusively on the question of
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communist inf iltrflti nni ra o f or g ani2 ed labor, education and
government
.
The committee issued its first report in January 1939,
defining UnAmericanism and Communism. Citing the "Trojan
Horse" tactics of Communism, the report suggested communists
infiltrated existing organizations or set up "front
organizations" dedicated to popular causes, but in reality
under the direction of Moscow. Witnesses identified 640
organizations, 483 newspapers and 280 labor unions which
they said were communistic, including the Boy Scouts, Camp
Fire Girls and several Catholic organizations. At least one
member of the committee branded the New Deal itself as
communist. Representative J. Parnell Thomas, a Republican
member of the committee claimed the New Deal was "working
hand in glove with the Communist Party" and that it was
"either for the Communist Party, or is playing into the
hands of the Communist Party." [16]
One of the "experts" on communism called to testify
before the Dies Committee was Father Charles Coughlin. In
his ongoing battle with the CIO he released to the committee
a copy of remarks made to him in a private conversation with
Homer Martin, former head of the United Auto Workers, in
which Martin claimed most of the leadership of the union
were communists. When Martin was forced to acknowledge the
comments in public it made the split within the UAW
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irreversible, provides Coughlin Hit h a sense of victory
over the CIO. [17]
The fact that a standing committee of the congress was
leveling the same charges as Coughlin, and providing him
with yet another forum for his attacks, could do nothing but
lend credence to his charges. The criticism leveled at the
tactics of the committee, and the ridicule of some of the
testimony by the press, was not keeping the public from
being impacted. A poll conducted in November of 1938 showed
that 60 percent of the respondents had heard of the
committee, and 74 percent of those familiar with the
committee felt its findings were "important enough to
justify continuing the investigation." A year later, a
similar poll found support for continued funding of the
committee at 75 percent. [18]
As FDR approached the midpoint of his second term he
found himself embroiled once again in charges that he was a
communist or under the influence of communists within the
New Deal. He openly admitted to both Harold Ickes and Norman
Thomas that his policy on Spain revolved around the position
of the Catholic hierarchy, which was based on the now
official anti-communism of the church, and the need to keep
Catholic voters in the Democratic Party. A resurgent Father
Coughlin was continuing his attack on the New Deal and the
President. Conditions in Europe were rolling toward war and
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speculation was beginning to ,ount that the President would
seek an unprecedented third tar,. Having seen the effort FDR
*ade to keep the "Catholic Vote" in the '36 election, and
his position on Spain designed to keep it in the '38
.idtera
elections it see B s clear that a pattern is developing in the
President's political relations with American Catholics,
centering around the i<;<5iiP * e j6 a un ssue of anti-communism and leading to
Teheran and Yalta.
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CHAPTER 6
PAPA ANGELICUS
Events in Europe were rapidly deteriorating in early
1939 when Pope Pius XI died on February 10. While the
college of Cardinals began to assemble in Rome to choose a
successor, Hitler was pressing the government of what
remained of Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement, which had
"guaranteed peace in our time" was falling apart under the
onslaught of Nazi demands.
On March 2, the traditional puffs of white smoke arose
from the Vatican announcing to the world the selection of a
new Pope. Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli had been elected and
chosen the name Pius XII. The former Papal Secretary of
State who sat by the fire with FDR at Hyde Park after his
reelection in L936 was now the leader of worldwide
Catholicism. The election of a new Pope whose career within
the church centered on Germany and diplomacy was widely
regarded as a signal the church planned on playing a role in
seeking a peaceful solution to the problems in Europe. The
election also initiated a series of events which would alter
the relationship between FDR and American Catholics.
The new Pope was immediately faced with a crucial
decision concerning the American church left by the sudden
death of his predecessor. The most powerful position in the
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African hierarchy had been vacant since the death the
Previous September of Cardinal Hayes of the archdiocese o£
New York. Speculation on a successor to Hayes centered on
Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit and Archbishop John
McNicholas of Cincinnati, both longtime friends of FDR.
However, barely a month after being named Pope, Pacelli
turned to his old friend the Auxiliary Bishop of Boston,
naming Francis J. Spellman the new Archbishop of New York.
Under Spellman's tutelage the chancery office of the
archdiocese would come to be known as the "Powerhouse" by
political leaders of both parties and all religious
denominations
.
With the deteriorating European political situation
the new Pope needed as many friends in high places as he
could find. By the end of March Czechoslovakia disappeared
from the map of Europe, absorbed by Germany, Poland and
Hungary. Hitler was now turning his attention to Poland. The
attitude of the new Pope toward the Third Reich was of great
interest to the Fuehrer. Pacelli served as Papal Nuncio in
Germany from 1917 to 1929, and negotiated the concordat
between the Reich and Vatican in 1933. There were some 35
million Catholics in Germany (including Hitler who was a
nominal Catholic), and they, along with the Socialists, had
provided the main support of the Weimer Republic. Hitler
despised the political nature of the German church, and
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immediately outlawed the Catholic Party upon taking office.
In spite of the concordat confessional schools can,e under
attack, along with Catholic Action Leagues, Catholic labor
unions and the Vatican iUpif a ~<-xua tseu as a non-German foreign
influence
. [ 1 ]
While Hitler was completing the destruction of Czech-
oslovakia the German Foreign Office was completing an
analysis of the new Pope. The memorandum on Pacelli stated
"His advocacy of an orthodox church policy repeatedly
brought him into conflict with National Socialism on matters
of principle." The Foreign Office regarded Pacelli as a
"Germanophile" as a result of his long tenure in Germany. He
admired German culture, philosophy, music and literature.
The report also drew attention to the fact the new Pope
seemed particularly affected by the appellation "Papa
Angelicus" associated with his reign. The term referred to
the prophecy of St. Malachy which attributed to the 106th
Pope a revival of Apostolic simplicity and zeal which would
inaugurate a new age. [2]
While Hitler continued his pressure on Poland his Axis
partner Mussolini took the opportunity to invade Albania in
early April. This move solidified the resolve of Great
Britain and France as both countries guaranteed the borders
of neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. FDR meanwhile sent a
letter to Hitler on April L5 listing 31 countries and asking
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the Fuehrer "to give assurances that your ar.d forces will
not attack or invade the territory" of any of the m . The
President sought the support of the Vatican to his peace
initiative. Undersecretariat of State Sumner Welles
approached the Apostolic Delegate Ameleto Cicognani through
Monsignor Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
The Vatican already had been approached by both Britain and
France to support the proposal. The Vatican, however, took
the position that the President's letter reflected an
unneutral attitude, would be rejected out of hand by the
Axis leaders and that a Vatican endorsement would reduce the
Pope's influence in Germany. [3]
Hitler's response to FDR's peace proposal indeed took
the form of the total rejection the Vatican predicted. The
Fuehrer publicly rebuked the President before the Reichstag
on April 28. William Shirer called Hitler's speech that day
"the most brilliant oration he ever gave," and that "for
sheer eloquence, craftiness, irony, sarcasm and hypocrisy,
it reached a new level that he was never to approach again."
[4]
The Fuehrer's rejection of FDR's proposal did not
deter the Pope from putting forth his own peace plan in
early May. The Pope's plan was given to the Fuehrer by the
Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo. According to
the German report of the meeting the Nuncio told Hitler of
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the Pope's concern about the tension in Europe, and his
desire to do all in his power to prevent the outbreak of
war. He suggested a conference of the five great powers of
Europe to discuss the Ge r nan
-Po 1 i s h and Franco-Italian
Problem before they got out of hand. Hitler responded that
the danger of war was exaggerated by propaganda, and in any
event he would have to discuss such a proposal with
Mussolini first. He concluded by saying he would "In a very
short time. ..let the Pope have his answer." [5]
The five great powers of Europe included in Pius' plan
were Britain, France, Poland, Germany and Italy. The British
Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, in a conversation with the
Apostolic Delegate in Britain, expressed regret that the
Russians were not invited to attend the conference, and was
told "that in no circumstances would it be possible for the
Pope to consider such an approach." His predecessors
encyclical effectively banned any cooperation with the
Soviet Union. This official Catholic anti-communism would
become an increasingly difficult problem for FDR and
American Catholics to deal with in coming months. [6]
However, despite Halifax's admonitions , the British
were in something of a quandary themselves at that moment as
to what role the Soviets were to play in the European
situation. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov approached both
the British and French in April with the possibility of
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forming an alliance of the thr PPD Ilre e governments to protect all
the nations of central ^nH =^^4.c a d eastern Europe which felt
threatened by Germany. When the British government had act
accepted the proposal by early May Winston Churchill was
openly critical stating "there is no Beans of »aintaining an
eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid
of Russia." [7]
On May 17 Berlin Nuncio Orsenigo was finally given
Hitler's response to the Pope's peace initiative
. Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop told the Nuncio that while Hitler
and Mussolini were "very grateful to the Holy Father for his
benevolent intervention on behalf of universal peace. ..they
think the moment is not yet ripe for a conference" to
discuss the outstanding issues between the various nations.
The Nuncio reported that when questioned on the current
international situation Ribbentrop replied that "Poland, if
she judges badly enough to provoke a war, will be crushed in
less time than it takes to say it." He also offered that
Germany was not afraid of war with France and England which
would not be able to penetrate Germany's defense in the west
except at a cost of a million men. More importantly,
Ribbentrop raised the prospect of Germany reaching an
agreement with Russia. Noting Stalin's displeasure over the
British and French position and the dismissal of Litvinov he
said "We have no quarrel with Russia except about
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us
Bolshevism in other words „e do not want its perfidio
propaganda for a world revoiution
. . . but should Russia drop
this propaganda nothing prevents us from drawing closer
together." [8]
While the Pope "in no circumstances" would approach
the Soviet Union, and the British were putting off
responding to Soviet overtures for an alliance against
Germany, the German Foreign Minister was acknowledging to a
Vatican official the prospect of a German-Russian
accommodation. The prospect of an alliance between Hitler
and Stalin must have seemed so remote as to border on the
preposterous. There is no indication in the Vatican
documents that this information was passed on to any other
European embassy.
FDR meanwhile reopened the prospect of establishing
some type of permanent diplomatic relationship with the
Vatican. Sumner Welles had been meeting regularly with the
Apostolic Delegate to Washington, Ameleto Cicognani, and
Msg. Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Council. Welles
was expressing the continued desire of the President to
convene a conference aimed at resolving the European
situation, and that the "United States government was
prepared to take part in a conference of nations to adjust
the present causes of world unrest." FDR seems to have been
disturbed by the exclusion of the U.S. from the Pope's
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original proposal for a peace C0nferenc6) and _ indicating
a firm wish to be included in any future plans. [9]
In August, FDR asked Welles' opinion on the
advisability of establishing diplomatic relations with the
Vatican. Welles responded that the Vatican had access to
valuable sources of information
"particularly with regard to
what is actually going on in Germany, Italy and Spain" which
the U.S. did not possess, and the ability to get that
information "was of considerable importance." The U.S. had
maintained official diplomatic relations with the Vatican
prior to 1867, when congress reacted against an unpopular
President and a more unpopular Pope by cutting off funds for
the mission. The subsequent loss of the Papal States removed
the justification for maintaining relations with the Vatican
as a foreign state, but the Lateran Treaty had returned that
status to the Vatican. Speculation that FDR intended to
reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican had been
high at the time of Pacelli's visit to the U.S. in 1936, and
indeed FDR discussed the possibility with Archbishop
Spellraan several times over the next two years. [10]
In October, after the outbreak of war, the President
again raised the issue with Spellman saying that "he was
looking for a moment and occasion suitable for a persuasive
appeal to the American people." Spellman said that the
present situation in which both the Vatican and the U.S.
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were working for the similar aim of restoring peace seemed
"favorable and propitious." When Spellman raised the
possibility that such an action would undoubtedly raise
criticism the President agreed, but added "I think that
every moment brings us nearer to the conclusion of this
matter." The President obviously had a plan, which he then
outlined to Spellman. He projected that the congress would
adjourn sometime in November after taking up the revision of
the Neutrality Act, and would not return until January 3. He
felt an announcement during that time would be appropriate
and that it could be justified by his belief that "such an
association would be of great help to the peace of the
world, as in effect it is." He also suggested the mission
could be viewed in terms of assistance to the refugee
problem. [11]
That the President had already made up his mind seems
clear. He then discussed the question of funding such a
mission, and proposed that it be considered a "special
mission of the United States Government to Rome accredited
to the Holy See" because special missions did not require an
Act of Congress for funding, "but once the mission has been
launched, if everything goes well, Congress could be induced
more easily to vote the funds for a permanent mission." FDR
had already narrowed the field of candidates to head the
mission to Myron Taylor and former Ambassador to Italy
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Breckenridge Long. Spelean said either .an would "be
suitable" because the Pope already knew Taylor and Long had
substantial diplomatic experience. [12]
If the President had not already decided on Myron
Taylor to head the mission to the Vatican at the time of his
-eting with Spellman he soon did. Taylor was almost the
Perfect candidate for the job. A Protestant, Episcopalian
with Quaker ancestors, he would not be accused of being
pro-Catholic. He could also not be accused of being a wild-
eyed New Deal social reformer. Formerly Chairman of the
Board of United States Steel, he still sat on the Board of
Directors. He was also a Director of American Telephone and
Telegraph and The First National Bank of New York. In
addition he had his own villa in Florence and could take
care of his own expenses if need be until government funds
were provided
.
While FDR was working out the details of this mission
to the Vatican the war in Europe seemed to come to an end as
abruptly as it started. The Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed
Poland just as Ribbentrop told Orsenigo back in May. The
lull in the war was now being dubbed Sitzkrieg . or the
sit-down war, by the western press. Hitler was making
overtures to the British that the war need not continue. The
Foreign Office was taken completely by surprise by the
Pope's latest effort to secure a peaceful settlement to the
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conflict. Sir D'Arcy Osborne, British Ambas£ador to ^
Vatican, informed the Forei s „ office in late November that
Pius had been approached f ^ B »*FKi n a to act as an intermediary for a
discontented group within the German Abwehr ied by Coionel
Hans Oster. This group contacted Monsignor Ludwig Kaas,
former leader of the German Centre Party living tn eitile in
Rome with a proposal for a military coup against Hitler
involving members of the General Staff. The conspirators
sought the Pope's guarantee that -if6 d i n if the coup were successful
the British would negotiate a peace based on the restoration
of Poland and non-German Czechoslovakia, but leaving Austria
as part of Germany. In other words post Munich Germany would
remain intact, but without a Nazi government. [13]
Notes went back and forth between Halifax, Chamberlain
and Osborne. The Foreign Office wanted to bring in the
French, but the Pope wanted to keep knowledge of the plan to
as limited a number of people as possible, and was convinced
the French would go along if the British agreed. The
negotiations dragged on until March with the Foreign Office
apparently vacillating between taking the matter seriously,
and then raising doubts about the nature of the conspiracy.
Osborne's diary relates his frustration with the long
process of communicating questions from Halifax and
Chamberlain to the Germans through the Pope and then their
response. The Germans in turn were attempting to find out
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»ho would be accepu.u to the BritJsh ^ ,
Sovernnent. The whole thl» s collapsed as the Generals
involved, including Berk a «w u nJ8 GC and "alder, put off acting as final
Preparations for the Snrino „ c
c
n b P mg offensive in the west drew
nearer. [14]
Meanwhile, on December 24, FDR announced he was
sending Myron Taylor to Rome as his "personal representative
to the Pope." The President was still clearly worried about
reaction to his announcement. He sent a letter to Pius
informing him of Taylor's appointment, and a similar letter
to Dr. Charles A. Buttrick, President of the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in America, and to Rabbi Cyrus Adler,
President of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The
President couched his appointment of Taylor in spiritual
terms, seeking the Pope's opinion on matters of peace and
guidance in these troubling times. He also asked Buttrick
and Adler to do the same. The difference, however, was
substantial, as pointed out by Cicognani: "the President is
sending a Representative to the Holy See, while to the two
above mentioned gentlemen he is extending a simple
invitation to call on him." [15]
The American Protestant community also noted the
difference. Buttrick's organization called for Taylor's
immediate recall. Protestant groups throughout the country
condemned the appointment, some in open anti-Catholic
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hostility, others calling on the tradition of the separation
of church and state. Dr. George Truett, President of the
Baptist World Alliance said the Pope "has in fact no better
title to receive governmental recognition from the United
States than. ..the head of the least of the Baptist
associations in the hills of North Carolina." FDR weathered
the criticism, cracking jokes at a press conference about
Just what an ambassador to the Vatican would do each day.
The strategy he outlined to Spellman worked, however, and
congress raised little objection to the Taylor mission when
it returned. [16]
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CHAPTER 7
"NOW COMES THIS RUSSIAN DIVERSION"
By late spring 1941 FDR was faced with the prospect of
yet another foreign policy decision which hinged on
overcoming American hostility to communism, and in
particular American Catholic ant i
-communism
. Virtually all
intelligence information was pointing to the fact that
Hitler intended to invade the Soviet Union. This information
was given to Soviet Ambassador Constantin Oumansky by Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles in early March. Welles
later commented that Oumansky "turned very white" upon
hearing the news, but in Welles' judgment Oumansky was
poorly informed by Moscow on German/Soviet relations, and he
doubted Oumansky ever passed the information on to
Moscow. [1]
On June 22, the rumors turned into reality as the
Wehrmacht drove into Russian territory along a thousand mile
front extending from the Baltics to the Balkans. Churchill
had his eastern front at last, and immediately announced
that Britain would "give whatever help we can to Russia and
the Russian people." The President and the State Department
waited a full day before making an announcement. Historian
Walter LaFeber described the statement released by the State
Department on June 23 as "less than enthusiastic; for
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example it criticized the Soviets for not allowing full
freedom of religion." This is something of an
understatement. The text stated "that freedom to worship God
as their consciences dictate is the great and fundamental
right of all people." This right was "denied to their
peoples by both the Nazi and Soviet Governments." The
"communistic dictatorship" of the Soviet Union was as
"intolerable and as alien" to the people of the United
States as the "Nazi dictatorship." [2]
The key to FDR's thinking at this crucial juncture of
the world crises is contained in his only modification to
the statement prepared by the State Department. The final
sentence was added at the President's instruction: "Hitler's
armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas." The
President approved the stress on religious freedom contained
in the State Department draft and highlighted the greater
threat presented by Hitler's Germany for two reasons. He was
not yet convinced that Soviet military capability would
permit them to hold out very long against the Germans, and
he knew that offering assistance to the Soviets would raise
a firestorm of religious-based criticism, particularly among
American Catholics. Three days after the statement was
released the President wrote to Admiral Leahy. "Now comes
this Russian diversion," he said, "If it is more than just
that it will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi
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worry about any possibility of Russian domination ..."[ 3
]
The American Catholic community was as divided as the
rest of the country concerning the great isolationist vs.
interventionist debate. But even Catholic interventionists
would have difficulty overcoming the moral question of aid
to the Soviet Union in light of Pius XI's outright
condemnation of atheistic communism and prohibition against
working with communism "in any undertaking whatsoever." The
immediate problem was compounded by Hitler's assertion that
his attack on Russia was a "crusade" against godless
bolshevism. Most observers believed this was an open attempt
to gain the support of the Vatican for the German war
effort. Both sides of the issue were quickly addressed by
members of the American hierarchy.
Bishop Joseph P. Hurley of St. Augustine gave a speech
on July 6 in which he attacked those he called "Nazi
sympathizers over here" who were attempting to cast the new
conflict in Europe as a "holy crusade against communism." It
was not a crusade, Hurley said, and "its standard is not the
cross but the swastika which a great Pontiff called the foe
of the Cross of Christ." Hurley, who spent 12 years in the
Vatican Secretariat of State prior to being assigned to St.
Augustine, concluded by calling Nazism the number one enemy
of America and the world. [4]
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e out
Francis J.L. Beckman, Archbishop of Dubuque, spok
for the isolationist wing warning that "co^unisB,
COffllani81
' —
ism Cis] everywhere gaining ground," and
asking how one could "account for the coddling of Communist
agents and dupes in every responsible branch of our
government." Beckman charged that Britain had allied herself
with a devil and was not fighting "the Battle of
Christianity." The pages of Father Coughlin's Social Ju^icg
were filed with anti-British and anti-communist statements
since the outbreak of the war in 1939. With the German
invasion of Russia the newspaper congratulated Churchill for
enabling "Stalin to dagger Hitler in the back." [5]
By August FDR was so concerned about Catholic reaction
he had Myron Taylor meet with Archbishop Mooney and Msgr.
Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Both men
expressed concern "that the announced policy of aid to
Russia creates a delicate situation in the United States."
They were concerned with the activities of the America First
Committee "and their willingness to exploit to the full
every possible source of support." The Catholic groups
associated with America First were utilizing Pius XI's
statement on atheistic communism while ignoring his equally
strong condemnation of Nazism. A possible crack in the
statement was argued in the context that it "refers to the
domestic rather than the international field." This argument
105
was already under attack, howevern , as a compromise in
Principle and failure to accept a clear pronouncement of
Papal authority." Both men feared that "any academic or
unofficial interpretation of the Papal statement" would
"create a definite and disastrous cleavage in Catholic
ranks, both clerical and lay." The only way out of the
dilemma would be "some word or gesture on the part of the
Holy Father himself" that would clearly indicate the
possibility of cooperation with communism on an
international level. [6]
In early September America First began a national
campaign to draw attention to the papal encyclical. Letters
went out to all local chapters, newspaper ads were prepared
showing the persecution of the church in Russia and the
national headquarters agreed to finance a national poll of
Catholic clergy to assess opinion on the administrations
policies toward the Soviet Union. FDR, however, was ready to
act on the advise of Mooney and Ready and seek a
clarification from the Pope on the exact meaning of Divini
Redemptoris
.
The personal relationship established with
Pacelli in 1936, and the diplomatic connection established
in 1939, was about to pay a dividend in domestic politics.
The President sent Myron Taylor back to Rome carrying a
personal letter to Pius. [7]
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By the time FDR wrote to the Pope he had received the
optimistic report from Harry Hopkins that Stalin was indeed
prepared to continue the fight against Hitler in spite of
the continued Russian reverses. The Russians were putting up
a stiffer resistance than either the British or American
military projected, but the opinion still prevailed that
they would not last long, in spite of what Hopkins reported.
The letter Taylor earned to the Pope explained that he was
prepared to "discuss with Your Holiness certain matters with
regard to which I am very desirous that he explain my
feelings and American opinion." The first matter on the
agenda was the "attitude of the Russian Government and the
Russian people toward religion." The President said he
believed there was "a real possibility that Russia may as a
result of the present conflict recognize freedom of religion
in Russia." This recognition would of course exclude the
possibility of intervention in educational or political
affairs. This would also mean religion in Russia would be
"on a much better footing than religious freedom is in
Germany today." [8]
The President said Russia was "governed by a
dictatorship as rigid in its manner of being as the
dictatorship in Germany," but the "Russian dictatorship is
less dangerous to the safety of other nations" than the
German model. Propaganda was the biggest threat presented by
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the Soviets, which the Germans used also, but had
"undertaken the employment of every form of military
aggression outside of its borders for the purpose of world
conquest by force of arms." He went on to say the survival
of Russia was less dangerous to religion, to the church and
to the world in general than the survival of Germany. He
concluded by saying Taylor would explain his feelings "in
order that Your Holiness nay understand my position in this
respect." [9]
The official Vatican response clearly indicates the
Pope and Cardinal Maglione did not share the President's
belief that Russian Communism constituted a lesser threat
than Nazism. The elimination of both would clearly result in
a "period of tranquility for Europe," but if one of these
evils remained an active force Europe would soon find itself
in the same situation it now faced. If communism triumphed
there would be no resistance to its spreading to "the
Germanic peoples, the Slav races and finally among the
Latins." The Vatican pointed to the invasion of "Poland,
Esthonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia" as
evidence that Russian Communism was as militaristic and
aggressive as Nazi Germany. Finally, the Russian resistance
so far in the Russo-German war was ample evidence of the
"immense war preparations which Communism has made." [10]
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In spite of all the objections the Pope realized the
Political problem the Present faced. Taylor must have
conveyed the President's belief, still prevalent in his
Military advisors, that Russxan militarism simply was not
the same thing as German militarism. Taylor must have also
conveyed the sentiments of Mooney and Ready on the need for
some clarification from the Pope on Divini R^de^toris In
an allocution delivered in late September the Pope, while
confirming the Church's condemnation of Communism, made a
distinction between the communist government of Russia and
his "paternal affection" for the Russian people. Taylor was
informed of the Pope's speech, and the Apostolic Delegate in
Washington was informed of the "elaboration of the meaning
o f Divini Redemptnri
, [11]
FDR had once again managed to reach an accommodation
with the Catholic hierarchy in support of his policies.
Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati sent a letter to all the
priests and laity of his diocese stating the "clear
distinction that Pope Pius made between the system of
atheistic communism, which he condemned, and the Russian
people, whom he loved, we shall be able to rid ourselves of
much perplexity regarding the Russian situation." The
reaction was much the same throughout Catholic America, with
the exception of Father Coughlin who continued to vilify the
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President and promote a vicious pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic
position in Social .Tncf^. [12]
On December 7 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
brought the United States into the war. On December 6 the
Russians began a counterattack along a 350 mile front,
inflicting the first severe setback to the Wehrnacht since
the war began. The Russian front was going to be more than
just the "diversion" FDR hoped for in June. When Myron
Taylor returned to Rome the following September he was no
longer trying to assure the Pope the Soviets would not
dominate Europe after the war, he was telling him they would
get what they wanted, and it was necessary to find a way to
work with them.
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CHAPTER 8
"THE DEVIL IS A COMMUNIST"
The evening before the final session of the Teheran
Conference FDR dined with Churchill and Stalin. When dinner
was over the President excused himself fro* after-dinner
coffee and cigars claiming he was not feeling well.
Churchill, Eden, Stalin and Molotov engaged in general
conversation which eventually turned to the question of I
Poland. According to Eden the discussion went favorably with
both sides believing the sooner the issue could be resolved
the better. The problem lay in the fact that the "Americans
are terrified of the subject which Harry [Hopkins] called
'political dynamite' for their elections." Eden told Hopkins
the situation would only get worse the longer it was left
unresolved and that in six months, with Russian armies in
Poland, the elections would be that much closer. [L]
The conversation turned to generalities about the
progress of the war during which Churchill remarked that he
believed God was on the side of the allies. Stalin grinned
when he heard the translation of the Prime Minister's
remark, and interjected that the devil was on his side
"Because, of course, everyone knows that the devil is a
Communist, and God, no doubt, is a good conservative." Over
coffee and cigars on the final evening of the Teheran
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Conference the stumbling blocks of the postwar peace were
outlined: Poland, religion and the American election. [2]
The President returned from Teheran in time to present
his annual Christmas message to the American people from his
home in Hyde Parle. He told the nation that he had gotten
along fine with Marshal Stalin and believed in the future
"we are going to get along very well with him and the
Russian people-very well indeed." As events unfolded in
early 1944 the public optimism the President expressed in
his Christmas message began to give way to the hard
political reality of dealing with Stalin's demands. [3]
The stalemate which existed in Soviet/Polish relations
since the previous April took on new significance on January
4 when Soviet forces entered Poland. Now that Soviet troops
were returning to eastern Poland the London Poles were
anxious to resume relations, and establish a basis for
cooperation between the advancing Red Army and the
Underground Home Army. In Washington, Jan Ciechano wski , the
Polish Ambassador of the government-in-exile, was told by
Secretary of State Cordell Hull that in his opinion "the
British Government, as an ally of both Poland and of Russia,
was in a better position to initiate appropriate steps than
the American Government" in terms of mediating a
reconciliation between the Soviets and the
government-in-exile. Hull was conveying to the London Poles
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mean-
the same message FDR had give n to Stalin at Teheran: he
could not take a public stand on the Polish issue. Averell
Harris later su„ed up the President's thinking at this
Point, "The 1944 election was fast approaching and he
Preferred to postpone the Polish outcry until after the
votes were counted, leaving Churchill to take the lead
while." Britain's formal treaty obligations the British had
with both Poland and Russia provided FDR with an excuse to
avoid taking a public position on Poland. [4]
It soon became evident that Hull had not delivered the
U.S. position to the Poles too soon. The offer of the London
Poles to resume relations with the Soviets and coordinate
activities between the Red Army and the Home Army was
tersely rejected. The Soviets also rejected the "erroneous
affirmation" by the London Poles that the area the Red Army
was operating in was part of Poland. It was well known, they
said, that the "Soviet constitution established a
Soviet-Polish frontier corresponding with the desires of the
population of western Ukraine and western White Russia...
[and]the territories ... were incorporated into the Soviet
Union." In other words the Soviets were operating within
their June 1941, borders. [5]
On January 22, Churchill met with the Premier of the
Polish government-in-exile, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and
proposed a five point program as the basis for renewed
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recognition by the Soviets n.. The Premier was told that if hi,
government would aeree f rtg to the acceptance of the so-called
Curzon Line as the basis of the western Polish frontier:
linking the eastern frontier to the grant to Poland of East
Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia to the Oder River, Poles
on the Soviet side of the eastern frontier would be granted
the right to return to Poland, all Germans within the new
Polish frontiers would be removed, and the guarantee these
agreements would be honored by the three principal United
Nations, relations with the Soviets could be resumed. In
reality this was the agreement the "Big Three" had reached
at Teheran. It was also the outline of the new Poland Myron
Taylor had carried to Rome in September of 1942. [6]
Churchill kept Stalin apprised of his negotiations
with the London Poles. He also cabled Roosevelt on the
position he was taking with Mikolajaczk. He informed the
Polish Premier that even though England had gone to war over
Poland they had not done so for the sake of "any particular
frontier," but rather for the existence of a strong, free,
independent Poland." Churchill said Stalin also supported
this view, and that even though England would have continued
to fight Germany alone "the liberation of Poland from the
German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous
sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies." Poland
would have to accept the fact that the allies would have a
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ave."
large say about "the frontier
.f territory she should h
The Poles were will ing to consider the matter, according to
Churchill, but they refused to settle border issues prior to
a general peace conference after the war. [7]
The border issue became secondary in early February.
Stalin informed British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
that at least three of the members of the Polish
government-in-exile were unacceptable to him and he would
not deal with them. FDR was anxious where this latest
difficulty would lead. On February 7, he cabled Stalin that
he appreciated his desire "to deal only with a Polish
government in which you can repose confidence," and while
public opinion was still solidifying around the "broad
principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Teheran
conferences," it would be better to allow the Polish Prime
Minister to make changes in the makeup of that government
"without any evidence of pressure or dictation from a
foreign country." [8]
While the question of Poland was beginning to heat up
the President found himself embroiled in yet another issue
highlighting the the ability of the Vatican to bring both
domestic and international political pressure to bear on
American public opinion: the bombing of Rome. While Italy
formally surrendered to the Allies in September of 1943
stiff German resistance continued in that country. As Allied
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forces began to m0 ve up the peninsula in early 1944 bombing
raids in Rome and other military targets resulfced ^
and casualties within Vatican City, the Papal Villa at
Castelgandolfo and the Abby of Monte Casino.
By mid-February public attention was being divided
between the deteriorating Polish situation and the flurry of
diplomatic correspondence between the Vatican and
Washington. Archbishop Ameleto Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate
at Washington, was conveying the objections to the Allied
bombing being made by Pius XII and Luigi Cardinal Maglione,
Vatican Secretary of State, to the President and the State
Department. The Vatican flatly denied Allied military
reports that Monte Cassino and Castelgandolfo were housing
German military personnel
. General Mark Clark of the U.S.
Fifth Army later confirmed that no German military personnel
were using either site. Archbishop Spellman notified
Roosevelt that he intended to speak out publicly on the
matter, a departure from the archbishop's usually cordial
relations with the President. At St. Patrick's Cathedral on
Washington's birthday Spellman deplored the fact that
American armed forces had attacked "the territory of a
neutral state" in spite of the fact that the Pope himself
had denied that German troops were ever stationed in the
areas under attack. [9]
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On March 12 and April 1 the archbishop spoke on the
subject again, as bombing raids in and around Rome continued
to damage churches and shrines. The fact that Spellman would
speak out publicly against the actions of American armed
forces in the midst of a popular war effort, and an election
/ear, suggests the possibility that something deeper was
involved. In fact, the Vatican was marshaling an
international effort on the bombing issue. On March 15, the
Irish Ambassador to the United States delivered a message
from Prime Minister deValera seeking an agreement by which
"Rome may be saved." The Irish vote could not be overlooked.
Similar appeals came from the Spanish government, and from
several South American Republics. [10]
The situation was becoming serious in the eyes of the
administration. On March 18, Secretary Hull cabled all
diplomatic representatives in the South American Republics
to "give your serious and urgent attention to the
possibility of discreetly stimulating some comment on the
part of high public officials, cultural leaders, and
prominent newspapers" that responsibility for placing
Christian shrines in jeopardy in Rome lay with the Nazis,
who continued to use the city for military purposes, and not
with the Allied airforce. The administration was promoting a
counterattack of world opinion. Domestically, the situation
was not much better. A poll conducted in late April asked
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"Do you think the Allied Airforce should bomb Rome?"
Nationally, only 37 percent of ^ respo „dents ^
while 57 percent said no, and 12 percent had no opinion.
Among Catholics only 24 percent said yes with 67 percent
saying no an 9 percent with no opinion. Protestant response
»as 36 percent yes, 52 percent no, and 12 percent no
opinion. Clearly, a majority of American public opinion, led
by American Catholics, was lined up against the
administration. [11]
At virtually the same time that Spellman opposed the
bombing of Rome, Reverend Gerald G. Walsh, Professor of
History at New York's Fordham University and editor of
Fordham's quarterly journal Thoug ht, spoke to the Women's
Press Club of New York. The theme of Rev. Walsh's speech was
the postwar peace. He quoted from a 1939 speech of Pius XII:
"The real lesson of history - that what is common to all men
and women is that they love the place where they were born,
and any future world must be planned on the premise that
they want their homeland to be free." In an obvious
reference to the recently concluded Teheran Conference Rev.
Walsh went on to say that peace plans currently under
discussion were merely "selfish nationalism based on the
military force of the Big Four." [12]
A respected Catholic historian and journalist, in an
election year, was publicly questioning the conduct of the
119
President'
s postwar pls„„i„ g ln front of an influe „ tlal
"li. Sroup. His superior, Archbishop Spelean, had Just
Public!, questioned the President's conduct of the war. And
this was not the first time Spelean had used Fordhan, In an
election year to send the President a message. In 1940, when
FDR was seeking an unprecedented third tern,, Spellman
invited FDR to a Fordhan, ROTC inspection, the timing „f
which was widely repAi-HpH i « 4-
k
ucj./ garded in the press as a subtle
endorsement of the President. The prospect could not be
ignored that a breach was developing between Roosevelt and
the Catholic hierarchy he had so assiduously cultivated over
the years
.
In the meantime, the Polish border question continued
to present problems. By early March, the cables between
Churchill and Stalin were becoming acrimonious. Stalin
accused Churchill of leaking confidential correspondence on
the Polish issue to the London press "with many distortions
which I have no possibility of refuting." Churchill
responded that the leak of information had come from the
Soviet Embassy in London, and in the case of The London
Tjrceg had come directly from the Soviet Ambassador Feodor
Gusev. At the same time he informed Stalin that he would
announce in the House of Commons that efforts to resolve the
situation between the Polish and Soviet governments had
broken down, that Britain continued to recognize the
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Sovernment-.n-exile, that tectorial
.uestions must await
the postwar peace conference, and that Britain would
recognize no forcible transfers of territory. Stalin
responded by saying he considered Churchill's message "full
of threats," and accused the Prime Minister of reneging on
the Teheran agreements concerning the restoration of the
Curzon Line. He said that if Churchill delivered the speech
outlined in his message it would be considered an "unjust
and unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union." The Soviets
continued to refuse to deal with the Polish
government-in-exile, which both Britain and the United
States recognized as the legitimate government of Poland.
The Soviets also continued to claim the area the Red Army
was currently operating in was not part of Poland but part
of the Soviet Union. [13]
The President apparently thought he had clarified the
nature of the political problems the Polish issue would
create for him with Stalin at Teheran, but the Soviet
Premier was doing nothing publicly which would help solve
the President's problems. Poland continued to remain an
issue in U.S. domestic politics. Suddenly, in late April, a
Polish Roman Catholic priest from Springfield, Ma., Rev.
Stanislauv Orlemanski, arrived in Moscow, at the personal
invitation of Stalin, and was granted two private interviews
with the Soviet Premier. The State Department denied any
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connection with the Orlemanski visit, saying hi£ visa had
been granted purely as a private citizen visiting the Soviet
Union. Bishop Oa=ar y of the Diocese of Springfield denied
that Orle.anski was on any niS sion sanctioned by Church
authorities
.
While the State Department continued to be rebuffed in
its efforts to obtain a visa for a Catholic priest to travel
to the Soviet Union to assist Father LeBraun in Moscow, a
Polish priest fro* a small parish in Springfield not only
obtained a visa but was granted private interviews with
Stalin. While not well known outside Polish-American circles
Orlemanski was not a stranger to either Stalin or FDR. He
first came to the attention of the OSS Foreign Nationals
Branch in the late summer of 1943. At that time he
established a "Kosciuszko League" in his local parish to
give moral support to the Kosciuszko Division which Stalin
had established in Russia to fight with the Red Army. This
organization quickly came to the attention of a pro-Soviet
Polish-American group in Detroit which had been involved in
the bitter sit-down strike union struggle of the 1930's. The
leader of this group, Waclaw Soyda, invited Orlemanski to
Detroit to establish a Kosciuszko League there as a prelude
to making it a national organization. [14]
In early November Orlemanski delivered a speech in
Detroit in which he attacked the Polish government-in-exile
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claiming they had "foresworn" their ri g ht to represent the
Polish people when the fled Poland. He also attacked their
Position on the territorial question of borders, arguing
that only the "Polish landed aristocracy was interested in
keeping the territory because they held great estates
there." TAS^ issued a lengthy report on the foundation of
the Kosciuszko League of which Orlemanski was named
"honorary president." Branches of the League sprang up in
Chicago, Winnipeg, Roxbury and West Springfield. According
to an FBI report on the League all the branches were largely
made up of "communists or communist sympathizers." [15]
In January, shortly after returning from Teheran,
Stalin had Foreign Minister Molotov propose to Ambassador
Harriman the inclusion of three Polish-Americans as part of
the government-in-exile: Oscar Lange, a professor at the
University of Chicago, Leo Krzycki, a leftist vice-president
of the CIO, and Orlemanski. Harriman was taken aback by the
proposal and told FDR not to dignify it with a response. In
February, however, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko
requested that Lange and Orlemanski be permitted to visit
the Soviet Union. At the same time DeWitt Poole of the OSS
was reporting that Orlemanski was having second thoughts
about his association with the pro-Soviet groups. Poole's
report confirmed that Orlemanski was not a communist but "a
strange blend of naive patriot, shrewd peasant and loyal
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Catholic." He viewed h-i * *s pro-Soviet
.activity as a means of
supporting FDR's position that h ( e *L10 the Soviets were our wartime
ally and declared that "If Roosevelt would declare war on
Russia today I would break all my sympathies for the Russian
cause and as an American go against Russia." [16]
While Father Orlemanski was meeting with Stalin the
political power of the Polish vote FDR was so concerned
about began to make itself felt. Just how important the
Poles were politically became clear when one hundred and
forty-seven speeches were made in congress celebrating
Polish Independence Day on May 3, while Orlemanski was still
in Moscow. Jan C i e c h a no ws k i , Polish Ambassador to the United
States notes in his memoirs that he was told the Polish vote
was critical to the President in five states; Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York.
The connection between this analysis and the total
Catholic vote is dramatically supported by a survey of
religious affiliations conducted among the members of the
78th congress and reported in the Spring 1944 issue of
Public Opinio n Quarterly
. The survey found that of 435
members of the House 80, or 18 percent, were Catholic. In
addition, 63 of the 80 were concentrated in nine states, the
five listed by Ciechanowski along with Massachusetts,
California, Wisconsin and Louisiana. The importance of these
nine states, representing 218 of the 266 electoral votes
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needed to win the president (over 80 percent), is quickly
evident for any presidential candidate. Also, the Democrats
had suffered substantial losses in the mid-term elections o
1942 when their majority in the House fell fro* 91 to only
14, and losing 8 Senate seats. Clearly, an erosion in the
Catholic vote represented by the loss of the Poles would
jeopardize the President's chances for a fourth term. No
wonder Hopkins had ter.ed the Polish issue "political
dynamite ."[17]
The President needed some indication from Stalin that
his concerns expressed at Teheran over the Polish vote, and
by implication the Catholic vote, would be addressed. The
answer was forthcoming from Father Orlemanski. On May 6
Father Orlemanski left Moscow to return to the United State
carrying with him a letter signed by Stalin which dealt wit
the question of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and
the possibility of cooperation between Stalin and Pius XII
"in the matter of the struggle against persecution and
coercion of the Catholic Church." The American Embassy in
Moscow learned of the contents of the letter from Harrison
Salisbury of the United Press. Orlemanski had allowed
Salisbury to make a copy of the letter under the condition
it would not be made public until he could discuss it with
Catholic authorities in the United States. [18]
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The Embassy cabled the President and the Secretary on
May 9 that while Orlemanski „« to the Soviet Union
"Primarily interested in the Polish question" he now
believed the letter he was bringing back fro™ Stalin »B0Ved
into the ,uch broader field of general relations between the
Kremlin and the Catholic Churrh •• n. p uOA" uurc
-
The Embassy reported that
Orlemanski did not fppi ran^Ki^ c jteel capable of dealing with a subject of
that magnitude and would submit the letter to Catholic
authorities in the United States. Salisbury believed the
letter represented "a definite manifestation of a desire to
bring about improved relations between the Soviet Government
and the Catholic Church and to remove a present source of
friction not only in Soviet-Polish relations but also in
relations with the United States." The cable concluded by
saying "The Embassy agrees with this estimate." [19]
Stalin seems to have been using the visit of Father
Orlemanski, arranged by FDR, to send a message that he was
willing to compromise on the issue of religious freedom in
the areas of Eastern Europe that the Red Army will soon have
under its control, and that FDR had already acknowledged to
Spellman would remain under Soviet control. Perhaps Stalin
felt this was the type of statement which Myron Taylor had
requested through Ambassador Maisky in London back in
October of 1942, or at least a starting point for
negotiating such a statement. Stalin was well aware of the
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President's preoccupation wlt h the question of freedom of
worship in the Sonet Union, dating back to the original
negotiations over recognition in 1933.
Clearly, Stalin was as aware as Roosevelt that
Catholicism could be the key to the Polish problem. Polish
nationalism and Polish Catholicism went hand-in-hand. The
staff at the American Embassy in Moscow apparently believed
that Stalin was sincere in this effort to relieve the
counting tension over the Polish issue. Spellman noted in
his memo to the Vatican the President's hope "that the
Russian intervention in Europe would not be too harsh." With
this in mind, and the President's repeated efforts to assure
some measure of freedom of worship in the Soviet Union, it
seems fair to conclude that FDR would view the possibility
of a rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin as a
step in the right direction in terms of relieving the
"harsh" Russian intervention in Europe. Domestic Catholic
reaction to such an arrangement could also be expected to be
less harsh in terms of possible defections from the
Democratic coalition.
However, the State Department soon had reason to doubt
the supposed importance of Orlemanski's letter. On May 24
Charles (Chip) Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern
European Affairs, reported to the Deputy Director of the
Division the gist of a conversation between Andre Visson of
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New Vor, toMUUtol and Viadiair Pravdin, head
Soviet lass Agenrv
,. According to Vtsson, Pravdin told
hi, it was the intent o £ the Soviet government to support a
"weli organized, dynamic and state-controiled Orthodox
Church which would have ?r Pa t ; nf1n g e influence throughout the
Balkans and the Near East" after the war. Pravdin doubted
the Vatican would respond favorably to the Orlemanski letter
because it was too "well informed" not to recognize Soviet
backing of the Orthodox Church as a much greater "threat to
Catholicism than Atheistic Communism had ever been." Pravdin
concluded by saying it was necessary to have "some force to
combat the Vatican" and as Protestantism was too divided to
do so "the only force capable of doing so was the Greek
Orthodox Church controlled by the Soviet Government [20
]
In the meantime, military events were rapidly changing
the context within which the political discussions were
taking place. On June 4 Allied forces liberated Rome. Two
days later Allied Armies landed at Normandy and the
long-awaited second front was finally established. Some of
Stalin's resentment seems to have given way to his
enthusiasm over the landing on the continent. He cabled
Churchill "the landing, conceived on a grandiose scale, has
succeeded completely," and that "the history of warfare
knows no other like undertaking from the point of view of
its scale, its vast conception, and its masterly execution."
128
He was obviously plea«?PH f ~ v,7 P ased to have some of the pressure taken
off the eastern front. [21]
On June 5, the very eve of the Normandy invasion,
Stanislaw Mikola jc2 yk, Preraier of ^ polish government
"in-exile, arrived in Washington for talks with FDR
. The
first meeting took place on June 7, and Jan Ciechano wski
,
Polish Ambassador to the U.S. described FDR as being in good
spirits following the successful landing the previous day.
FDR repeatedly stressed to Mikolajczyk the need for the
government-in-exile to reach an accommodation with the
Soviets. "When a thing becomes unavoidable one should adapt
oneself to it," FDR said, and asked Mikolajczyk if he agreed
with that theory. When the Polish Premier replied that the
Soviet demands were irreconcilable with the concept of
Polish independence and sovereignty, FDR replied: "remember
there are five times more Russians than Poles" and that
Russia "could swallow up Poland if she could not reach an
understanding on her terms."
Clearly, Roosevelt was trying to to impress on the
Polish Premier the seriousness of the situation facing the
Poles. In his memo to the Vatican, Spellman recorded what
FDR told him regarding the Soviet position on Poland and at
one point remarked "Poland
, if reestablished, would get
Eastern Prussia ." (emphasis added) FDR obviously feared for
the very existence of Poland, and Soviet military might was
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already dictating the realiHo. ilities of the situation on the
Sr0"d
^ POland ' JUSt " »• Soviets refused t0 aclM>lti8e
the Red Ar»y was in Poland rather t „ an Rus£ia ^
they c„„H i„ fact> as FDR^ ..^^ up „ ^ ^
Poland. For FDR the very existence of Poland was at stake,
and if Poiand ceased to exist what would be the reaction of
African Poles and their fellow, anti-com.unist Catholics?
To succeed in reestablishing the Polish state would be a
major diplomatic achievement, even if some territorial
concessions were needed to compensate for Soviet security
fears. FDR was eivine thp P^Ipc +- k *6
" 5 ne roles the same message in June
that Churchill gave them in January. [22]
FDR then said he thought it would be constructive for
Mikolajczyk to meet personally with Stalin. However, the
Polish Premier replied that without the support of the
President Stalin would insist on acceptance of his
conditions prior to any meeting; he asked Roosevelt to tell
Stalin he supported the government-in-exile
* s position.
Roosevelt replied that as a politician himself, Mikolajczyk
could understand that in his "political year" he could not
intervene with Stalin on the Polish issue. Both men were
obviously concerned with the impact of American public
opinion. Mikolajczyk was hoping to force the President's
hand into public support of the government-in-exile '
s
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position on the frontier issue by playing t , ^ ^
Polish electorate he knew FDR needed in November.
Roosevelt, having already agreed to ,„ch of Stalin's
position on the frontier issue at Teheran, was trying to
preserve see semblance of a Polish state, and reaoh a
co.pro.i.e acceptable to Poles in the United States as well
as Poland. One way to do that would be to insure the
reestablishn,e„t of the Polish state after the war, and to
insure that Poles would be able to practice their Catholic
religion.
Subsequent conversations between Roosevelt and
Mikolajczyk revolved around the efforts of the Polish Home
Army, and the need to supply them now that the Soviets were
in Poland. The President agreed that the underground army
was performing vital services to the Allies by disrupting
German activities behind the front. FDR used this issue to
stress again the need for Mikolajczyk to meet personally
with Stalin and inform him of the strength and activities of
the Home Army. He felt Stalin would be impressed and would
agree to coordinate Red Army plans with the Poles in order
to defeat the Germans.
The conversation then took an interesting turn. FDR
brought up Father Orlemanski's visit to Moscow. He said he
had been asked to meet with the priest but had not yet
decided if he would. It is interesting to note FDR's comment
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that he had not yet decided on feting with OrlcansRi
. On
June 2 the President was sent a roe roo by Secretary Hull
advising against such a me^-ino- u -i ieting. Hull disagreed with the
idea that the offer brought back fro, Stalin represented a
"real departure fro, the position of the Soviet government."
He referred to the "criticism from Po 1 i s h - Ame r i c an and
Catholic circles
." Hull believed all the information that
could be gathered on Orlemanski's visit with Stalin had been
obtained in the OSS interview conducted with him on his
return and that an "off the record" meeting could not be
kept secret and would generate more "unfortunate publicity."
Besides, Orlemanski had been summarily suspended from his
parish duties and ordered to the Passionist Monastery in
West Springfield by Bishop Thomas O'Leary of the Springfield
Diocese. Bishop O'Leary had been contacted by the Apostolic
Delegate Archbishop Ameleto Cicognani wanting to know "what
provision had been made for the parish of Father
Orlemanski." The reasons given for Orlemanski ' s suspension
were that he had left his parish without permission, and
that he had consorted with communists in violation of Pius
XI's 1937 encyclical. It was obvious the reaction of the
American Catholic Church was not what Orlemanski had
expected
.
[ 23 ]
In any case, FDR told Mikolajczyk he was interested in
the part of the priest's meeting with Stalin in which they
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had discussed freedom of v^i
•
id ° f rell 8ion in Russia, particularly
freed ° m R ° raan Cat ^lic Church. Stalin was reported
to have said he had no objection to freedom of religion,
only to the fact that there were so many religions in the
world. He added that to give religious freedom to one or two
denominations would result in do 2 ens more applying and felt,
"it might he better to unify religions." According to Jan
Ciechanowski the President felt this statement "might be an
indication that Stalin would favor a union between the
Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches," and he might
even be willing "to admit the Pope's leadership and allow
him to become head of the two united churches."
The President was making quite a leap from the note
concerning cooperation with Pius XII to allowing the Pope to
head a united church in Russia. Perhaps the President had in
mind Bohlen's memo outlining Stalin's postwar plan, and the
possibility of working around that problem. The President
then asked Mikolajczyk what he thought of Stalin's comments,
and the Premier replied that Stalin could indicate his
sincerity by releasing the Catholic priests imprisoned in
the Soviet Union. The President then turned the conversation
to other matters. FDR did not divulge to the Polish Premier
that the American Embassy in Moscow believed Stalin's
remarks were intended as a gesture "to remove a source of
friction" in Soviet-Polish relations. Neither did he attempt
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to certain the p„te„ tial threat to Poli£h Catholicism of ,
revitalised Orthodox Church under Soviet domination,
expressed in Bohlen's memo. [24]
On June 14 Mikolajczyk, ha vi„ s failed to extract a
public commitment from FDR to support the governme„t-i„-
axile's position on the frontier issue, returned to London.
The following day Roosevelt lunched with Archbishop Spellman
and made arrangements for the Catholic prelate to fly to
Rome on an Air Force -Diane tv„ t>r plan . The President quickly informed
Stalin that the visit of Mikolajczyk to Washington would
have no bearing on their Teheran agreements. FDR cabled the
Soviet Premier on June 17, and in what may have been a
reference to the upcoming U.S. elections stated "I deemed
his visit at this time as desirable and necessary for
reasons which Ambassador Harriman had already explained to
you." The President expressed the opinion that Mikolajczyk
was most concerned about the cooperation of the Red Army
with the Polish Home Army and the need to coordinate their
activities to defeat the Germans. He stated that Mikolajczyk
would be willing to go to Moscow to discuss the problems
between the Soviet Union and his government-in-exile, but
took no position favoring the Polish viewpoint as requested
by the Polish Premier. FDR concluded by saying, "You will
understand, I know, that I am in no way trying to press my
personal views upon you in a matter which is of special
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concern to you and your country." „. Preaident was
aCk"° Kled|in8 S^«^l s i6 „ ificance attached t0 the
Polish situation in term* «ts of security to the Soviet Uni
expressed by Stalin. [251
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CHAPTER 9
CULTS AND VOTES
On July 1,1944, Averell Harridan notified the State
Department of an announcement in Moscow concerning the
creation of a Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults
under the Council of the Commissars of the USSR
. The council
was to provide liaison between the government and religious
cults in the USSR, including the Catholic and the Greek
Catholic churches. Bohlen was quick to recognize one
possible implication of the new council. He viewed it as
potentially a positive step giving a "greater degree of
recognition than heretofore accorded" these religions and
said the council should be viewed in connection with the
"assurances given by Stalin to Father Orlemanski concerning
the Catholic Church." He concluded that the council was
"undoubtedly related with the Polish question and is
probably designed to provide machinery to handle questions
involving the Catholic population of eastern Poland which
the Soviet government intends to incorporate in the Soviet
Union." [1]
The Orlemanski mission was continuing to influence
State Department thinking in spite of Hull's rejection of
the letter from Stalin as offering nothing new to
Soviet-Polish relations. Bohlen had not forgotten the
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Pravdin conversation, however, and pointed out that "the
Greek Orthodox faith
...„„ virtually bee „ reC0s „ l2ed as ^
State religion and unquestionably win be utilized in that
guise as a political instrument of the Soviet State." No
other religion was going to be allowed to "develop to a
point where they might threaten the position of the official
Orthodox church." [2]
On July 12 the Pope's most recent concerns over the
Soviet Union were revealed to Myron Taylor in a lengthy
audience. The Pope raised three issues with Taylor: the
spread of communism in Europe and "its development in a
strong way in Italy, the "Russian attitude toward Poland"
and the "Russian attitude re: freedom of religion
generally." Taylor had told Joseph Davies that he was
disappointed the Vatican had not responded favorably to the
Orlemanski mission. Now he presented to the Pope a draft of
a statement which evolved following his discussions with
Ambassador Maisky in London in 1942 dealing with the form of
"assurance to be made by Marshal Stalin [that] would be
acceptable." He also informed the Pope that he had
"discussed the subject with the President of the United
States, with Secretary Hull and others, including members of
the Catholic hierarchy in America." [3]
The statement Taylor provided to the Pope contained
two elements. The first called on the Soviets to publicly
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P-claim "complete f reedom of religiou£ ^
01 wo rship in all Soviet territory>( . This wQuid ^ ^
with article 124 of the Soviet constitution and an
acknowledges of "the loyal participation in the defense
of the Fatherland by all Russian people," assumably
including Catholics. The second stipulated that "Any abuse
of these privileges, whether to organize movements or incite
the people to overthrow the Government, will be dealt with
in each case according to law." Taylor said both Pius XII
and his political advisor Monsignor Tardini accepted the
first point but rejected the second. Following his audience
with the Pope, Taylor met with Tardini who presented him
with a lengthy raemor andum outlining the Vatican's objections
to Soviet behavior toward the Catholic Church in Russia,
which Tardini said showed no significant improvement since
the war began. The memorandum concluded "in view of what has
been stated above and after the sad experience of the past,
it is necessary to follow a policy of watchful expectation
and reserve. "[4]
The Vatican did not rule out the possibility of
reaching an agreement with the Kremlin, but preferred to
watch developments unfold. Taylor suggested to FDR raising
the issue at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which has just
convened in Washington. FDR returned a message to Taylor
telling him he had reached "the reluctant conclusion that at
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this particular moment it would h«be unwise to raise the issue
[religious freedom] openly He said the Russians were "most
sensitive" and might consider such a request an "affront" to
the various statements they had already made concerning
"freedom of worship in the Soviet Union." Instead, FDR
wanted to pursue a policy of exerting U.S. "influence
quietly and constantly " to obtain "practical tests of
Soviet respect for that principle." This he believed was
*ore in keeping with the Vatican's position that they were
"wary of statements and intent upon concrete application."
[5]
By late July, events were coming together on all
fronts. FDR was overwhelmingly renominated by the Democratic
Convention to seek a fourth term; Archbishop Spellman was in
Rome where the American press was speculating on his "real
mission" as he had been granted several private audiences
with the Pope, and Polish Premier Mikolajczyk flew to Moscow
to talk personally with Stalin. On the same day the Pope
gave a speech encouraging Poles to work with the advancing
Soviet armies. In an address to 500 Polish soldiers, the
Pope "asked that Poles not seek vengeance against the
Germans or Russians that overran Poland in 1939, but in fact
should collaborate with the Russians." Pius said he was
still seeking an independent Poland. Members of the
diplomatic corps, commenting on the speech, said they
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believed it was extremely cautious
. This speech ^ ^ _
waning when seen in the context of the conversations held
on July 12 with Myron Taylor. Pius wass publicly
acknowledging Catholics ability to cooperate with the Soviet
Union within days of being told the President of the United
States was still working to produce a satisfactory agreement
which would guarantee the church freedom of movement in
eastern Europe, even if under Soviet control. [6]
On August 1, with encouragement from radio broadcasts
from Moscow, the Polish underground in Warsaw began open
resistance to the Germans occupying the city. The Hed Army
was only 10 miles from Warsaw and the Poles expected a quick
Soviet advance to liberate the city. By early September,
however, it was clear that the Red Army was not going to
assist the uprising. It remained exactly where it was when
the uprising began. Pleas for assistance from Stalin met
with excuses that military necessity prevented resupplying
the underground or advancing on Moscow. He also refused
permission for U.S. planes to land at Soviet bases if they
attempted to drop supplies. Churchill was furious and tried
to get FDR to agree to send American planes to drop supplies
to the Poles, and land at Russian bases without permission.
While the President complained to Stalin along with
Churchill about the lack of help to the embattled Poles, he
was not willing to follow the Prime Minister's latest plan.
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To do so would have destroyed the basis of trust which FDR
was trying to establish with Stalin. FDR finally notified
Churchill that he was informed the underground Poles had
left Warsaw and "There now appears to be nothing we can do
to assist the,." The fighting continued, however, for
another month. Finally, ln what Robert DalleR has ^
apparently cynical effort to refute accusations that they
wished to see Poland's no n
-c o „un i s t underground destroyed,"
and after yet another British appeal, the Red Army resu.ed
its advance on Warsaw, dropped supplies to the Poles and
agreed to let American planes land at Soviet bases after
dropping supplies. It was too late, however, and the
rebellion was crushed with some 250,000 Polish casualties.
[7]
In the meantime, the President was involved in a
bitter reelection campaign. Polls conducted in August and
early September showed Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey
holding a narrow lead over FDR overall, but in key electoral
vote states Dewey was ahead by large margins: Illinois, 54
to 46 percent; Ohio, 54 to 46 percent; Michigan, 57 to 43
percent; Wisconsin, 56 to 44 percent. These were the same
states cited by Ciechanowski where the Polish vote could
make the difference. By early October FDR was clinging to a
narrow 51 to 49 percent lead nationally .[ 8
]
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ear
,
It was beginning to appear that the President's £
expressed to Stalin at Teheran, was becoming a reality.
Events in Poland were driving Poles to see, answers fro. the
President. Just what was his position on Poland? Jan
Ciechanowski clai ras he was repeatedly being asked by various
Roosevelt campaign operatives his opinion on what would be
the most effective way to ensure the "Polish vote." And it
cannot be forgotten, as Secretary Hull pointed out during
the Orlemanski affair, "Catholic circles" were also showing
a great interest in Poland.
On August 15, Secretary Hull forwarded to FDR a
memorandum from Taylor dealing with the source of the
information which had led to the Pope's belief that American
Catholics supported a negotiated settlement to the war.
Taylor had heard from the British Minister to the Holy See,
Sir D'Arcy Osborne, that Archbishop Spellman had made the
same comment to him. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal,
currently in Rome, indicated that Spellman told him the same
thing prior to leaving for Rome. Taylor felt these
disclosures "may indicate a movement to bring about a
negotiated peace, along lines undisclosed to us directly."
It seems entirely possible that Spellman was advocating to
the Pope a policy that would bring an end to the war before
Russian armies could occupy the areas of Eastern Europe that
FDR had told him a year earlier would certainly remain under
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Soviet domination. may al£<;
atteroptins ^
the prospect of a potent!.! „„ lt of 30 ,000
,
000 Catholioo
asainst FDR f0 rei e „ pollcy la ^ ^ ^
Ca,PaiS
"'
JUSt I— of Six or seven Billi on
Polish voters. Whatever his motives, Ta yl or was spending
-uch of his tine trying to convince the Pope that "there is
no possibility of a ne rn ti a f D „ ~go ted peace and that the only terms
that will be offered tn t-h. r~rt a o he German Army are unconditional
surrender." [9]
On October 11, the White House issued a press release,
accompanied by photos, of a meeting between FDR and members
of the Polish American Congress, the same group that had led
the attack against Orlemanski's visit. The Poles were at the
White House to get the President's views on the continued
application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and
specifically how those principles applied to Poland.
According to Ciechano wski
, the Polish language press in the
United States was not satisfied with the President's
answers. Roosevelt knew of the continued dissatisfaction,
and arranged another meeting with Charles Rozmarek of the
PAC aboard his campaign train in Chicago on October 28,
seven days before the election. Ciechanowski says the
President promised Rozmarek that he would "take active steps
to insure the independence of Poland." The next day Rozmarek
endorsed the Democratic ticket. The President was being
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disingenuous with Rozmarei, u.K saarek. He was indeed pursuing a policy
for an independent Poland, it was Just not the sane Po la „d
the Poles were talking about
. But> as ^ ^ ^
Premier Mikolajczyk,
"When a *hi ncr u/ > wn t i g becomes unavoidable one
should adapt oneself to it." [10]
Meanwhile, Republican candidate Dewey was doing his
best to revive with voters the anti-communist theme of
Father Coughlin. In a speech at Boston, Dewey told his
audience that FDR had put his party on the auction block,
and the highest bidder was the Communist Party. "Now the
Communists are seizing control of the New Deal," Dewey said,
"through which they aim to control the Government of the
United States." He suggested that FDR pardoned Earl Browder
in time to help organize for the fourth term bid. Roosevelt
was furious, but his advisors were telling him he had to
answer the charges because "the voters were more afraid of
communism than fascism." [11]
The Polish vote held, however, and the President won
reelection on November 4, but although the electoral vote
count was overwhelmingly in Roosevelt's favor, the margin of
victory in the nine key states identified earlier as having
strong Polish or Catholic votes, was narrow indeed. In most
cases FDR won these states by the narrowest of any of his
previous elections, and his ability to hold the Catholic
vote could indeed be pointed to as the margin of victory.
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The President won Pennsylvania w-ifh six it 51 percent of the vote
and his plurality of 105 ,000 was over 500,000 less than J.
!93 6 victor,. Illinois „as virtuaJly ^^ ^
New Vork 52.3 percentP , Michigan 50.2 percent. In California
the President won „lth 56 percent „ f ^ ^ ^ ^ &?
Percent in 1936. Ohio and Wisconsin went Hepublican for the
first tine since 1928. James MacGregor Burns pointed out
that it was "remarkable that a forty-two-year-old governor
with experience in neither war nor diplomacy could come so
close to toppling a world leader at the height of a global
war." Soon after the election the Catholic hierarchy served
notice that it might not be so easy to maintain the Catholic
vote in the future. [12]
On November 13, a week after the election, the
American Catholic Bishops released a resolution on eastern
Europe passed by the administrative board of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference. The resolution noted the
"sufferings, misery and fears" of their fellow bishops,
clergy and religious throughout all of Europe and "The
circumstances of the moment excite in them a particular
anxiety for the fate of religion among their fellow
Christians in Poland, the Baltic States, and neighboring
Catholic lands." The resolution concluded, "American
Catholics would ever resent their country's being made a
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Party to the d e
-Chris t i am z at ion of historic Catholic
peoples
.
" [ 13 ]
Three days later, On November 16
,
the bishopfi released
a second, more lengthy statement on "International Order."
With victory in the war seeming
.ore certain each day the
statement opened "We have met the Challenge of War. Shall we
meet the challenge of Peace?" The bishops statement was in
response to the recently concluded Dumbarton Oaks
Conference. The State Department had asked for comments from
the public on the establishment of an international
organization aimed at securxng future peace. The New York
limes_ carried a page one story on the bishop's statement and
reprinted the entire text on an inner page. The Times
concluded the bishops were not opposed to the creation of
such an organization, but were putting forward moral
principles on which it should be guided. The statement said
"We have no confidence in a peace which does not carry into
effect, without reservations or equivocations the principles
of the Atlantic Charter." This seems a direct reference to
the previous statement on conditions in eastern Europe. [14]
Proper organization of the international community was
essential to establishing a just peace, according to the
bishops, and "To do this we must repudiate absolutely the
tragic fallacies of 'power polities' with its balance of
power, spheres of influence in a system of puppet
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governments, and the resort «to war as a means of settling
international d i f f i c ul t i * o » 1144.1.acuities. Without specifically mentioning
the Soviet Union the bishops saiH "rw . a 1n d The ideology of a nation
in its internal life la a concern Qf ^ internafcional
community" and stipulated that as a condition of membership
"every nation guarantee in law and respect in fact the
innate rights of men
, families and minority groups in their
civil and religious life." m essence the bishops were
continuing to call for a statement guaranteeing religious
freedom in the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern
Europe
. [ 15 ]
The bishops had just raised the stakes. Poland was no
longer an isolated ethnic political issue, if it ever had
been. It was now a Catholic issue, as was the fate of all
eastern Europe. FDR could not have been mistaken about what
the bishops were saying. The statement was signed by Edward
Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit; Samuel Stritch, Archbishop of
Chicago; Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York; John
McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati and John Noll, Bishop
of Fort Wayne. These were all the President's old friends,
the men who defended him in his battle over Mexico, against
the charges leveled by Father Coughlin; the men whose
position on Spain had influenced his policy.
Just what effect was all this having on American
public opinion? A poll conducted that same November revealed
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that a Miorlty of the American peopie stiii beiieved
could be trusted to cooperate with the Allies after the war
by a margin of 47 to 35 percent, while 18 percent did not
know. The poll was further broken down by income groups and
religious affiliation. Trust in continued Russian
cooperation was highest in the upper-income group with 56
percent overall believing i n continued cooperation. However,
there was a 14 percent difference within this group between
Catholics and Protestants; 44 percent of Catholics believing
Russia could not be trusted compared to only 30 percent of
Protestants. The margin of distrust narrowed in the
middle-income group where 34 percent of Catholics distrusted
the Russians and 31 percent of Protestants. Among
lower-income groups 48 percent of Catholics distrusted
Russia compared to 34 percent of Protestants. Clearly,
although still not a majority, distrust of Russia's postwar
cooperation was running high as the war drew to a close, and
American Catholics were far more likely to distrust Russian
intentions than their fellow Americans. [16]
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CHAPTER 10
"SAUL ON THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS
"
As 1945 opened it was becoming increasingly clear that
Stalin intended to have his way on the Polish question. On
January 3 he formally recognized the Polish Committee of
National Liberation, known as the Lublin Committee, as the
Provisional government of Poland. This was a move that both
FDR and Churchill had been attempting to forestall until the
Big Three met at Yalta. Anglo-American forces in the west
were just beginning to regain the offensive following the
breach of their lines in the Battle of the Bulge. And the
public was beginning to have serious doubts regarding the
conduct of the President's foreign policy. Pollster Hadley
Cantril reported to the President in early January that his
polls showed "a significant decline since the previous June
in public confidence that the President and other officials
were successfully handling the nation's interests abroad."
[1]
The President knew he was faced with a potentially
disastrous domestic political situation as he prepared to
leave for Yalta. The polls showed Catholic opinion in the
country at much higher levels of distrust in continued
postwar cooperation with Russia, and overall opinion on the
President's policies was now down as well. The Catholic
153
hierarchy had callpH -i ~+.ed into question the cornerstone of the
President's peace Pl a„, and challeneed ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Principles of the Atlantic Charter. Accordi„ s to Edward J
.
Flynn the situation of Paku.i j
"
° f Cathollcs in eastern Europe was on
FDR's mind as he prepared to leave for Yalta. Flynn, a
Ta" 3ny aSS ° C iate of A1 Smith and political boss of the
Bronx, tied his political future to FDR following the
disastrous 1928 election. Smith never forgave him, and when
FDR wanted New York Governor Herbert Lehman to appoint Flynn
to the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by Roosevelt's
nomination of Senator Royal Copeland as Ambassador to
Germany Smith effectively blocked the nomination. Lehman
would not make the nomination without Smith's approval as he
felt he owed his election as Governor to Smith's backing,
and Smith would not give his approval. [2]
In the long term, however, the backing of a powerful,
popular President proved more beneficial to Flynn than the
lack of approval from the ex-governor and defeated
Presidential candidate. Flynn was named Democratic National
Chairman by FDR in 1940, and now, in 1945, would be thrust
into the international limelight by FDR . According to Flynn,
FDR raised the issue of the "position of the Roman Catholic
Church in Russia and the Balkans after the war," during a
conversation in the White House. Flynn said FDR told him
"there could never be a permanent peace unless the large
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Catholic populations in p.i, nJPola d, Lithuania and the Balkans
"are permitted to practice their fait* freely. • He then
aaked Flynn to accompany hi. on the trip to Yalta and take
UP the problem with Stalin ana Molotov
. The Qf ^
conversation described hy Flynn see.s to indicate that FDR
had not changed his position on Russian donation of
eastern Europe that he outlined to Spelean in September of
1943, but was continuing to trv tn6 ° z y o tind a means of making it
"less harsh." [3]
On January 22, as the President and his party were
boarding for the journey to Yalt-,tuc Jr i j.ta, a single page document
was prepared in the White House for the President's
signature. It was addressed "To all diplomatic, consular,
army and navy officers of the United States Government." The
document said the bearer, "the Honorable Edward J. Flynn,"
was "engaged in a mission for me which involves a visit to
Moscow, with the approval of Marshal Stalin, and also a
visit to Italy before returning to the United States." It
then instructed all personnel coming in contact with Flynn
to "permit him to pass, without let or molestation," and to
extend to him all courtesies normally associated with
diplomatic personnel. The President, apparently with the
approval of Stalin, was in effect granting Flynn a personal
passport allowing him to travel anywhere in Europe under
U.S. military control. [4]
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While FDR see. to have been embarking on yet another
atte.pt to resolve the divisions befcween ^ ^ ^
Kremlin, Stalin was apparently e mbarking on his _ plan
While the Bi 6 Three were ne g otiatin g at Valta 0eor 6 e Kennan,
now back in the Moscow Embassy as Ch^, was sending a
Slurry of cables to the State Department dealing with so,
rather remarkable events taking place in Moscow surrounding
the Russian Orthodox Church. A Holy Synod of the Russian
Orthodox Eastern Church had been convened for purposes of
electing a new Patriarch of Moscow. Invitations had been
extended "through official Soviet diplomatic channels" to
the patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and
Jerusalem. The Patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria accepted
personally and the others sent "rather imposing delegations
of Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops." The visitors
were treated as official dignitaries, and shown great
hospitality by the Soviet government, (including a
performance of the Moscow Ballet). [5]
The Synod elected Alexei, Metropolitan of Leningrad
and Novgorod, as Patriarch on February 2, and an elaborate
coronation ceremony was planned for February 4, which Kennan
described as "in effect the ceremonial climax to the
reestablishment of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union."
Kennan followed his first cable with a second interpreting
the events and placing them in their political context. The
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-viva! of the MoscOH patriarch nothing ^ ^ ^
spontaneous M,«„„t on the part 0{ the church but [of, a
deliberate policy
„„ the part of the Soviet Regime." The
»v. was seen as an atte.pt to promote an "all-Slav" policy
based on the relig i0 us sentiments Qf a, Slav populati<>ns ^
areas coming under Soviet r .,t„i .,control. Also, the revival would
Provide the Soviets a channel of communication "to all
believers of the Eastern Church.
...An iron in the fire of
Hear Eastern politics through Russian Church
Property.
..[andja means of disarming criticism.
. .in „ester„
religious circles. "[6]
On February 8, Kennan sent another cable on the
implications of the recent religious activity in Moscow
dealing with the Soviet attitude toward the Roman Catholic
Church. He thought the fact the Soviet government was
sponsoring the reemergence of the Russian church might be
the result of "the unfruitful outcome of Father Orleraanski's
mission." Kennan felt the failure of Moscow and Rome to
reach an agreement following Stalin's statement to
Orlemanski resulted in the ability of the Russian Church to
emerge from "its former obscurity". He added that "Today,
all things indicate that the Kremlin is prepared to do open
battle against the influence of the Vatican." The Soviet
press was currently attacking the Vatican openly, but "How
this anti-Catholic tendency will affect Soviet policy in
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Poland, Hungary and Croatia is hoHever ,tm „ Qt apparent _„
He felt the Soviets policy toward Catholics in Central
Europe would prespnt a "k-i ut ^ ,P e a highly delicate problem for Russian
Church diplomacy." [ 7 ]
When William Bullitt wrote to FDR in early 1943 he
warned the President against the widespread assumptions
taking hold that Stalin had "changed his political
Philosophy," that he "has abandoned all idea of world
communism" and wanted to "have the Soviet Union evolve in
the direction of liberty and democracy, freedom of speech
and freedom of relieion " Tn ^ ^ ,t j-igi . ro accept such a view he said
"implies a conversion of Stalin as striking as the
conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus." As Ed Flynn
flew to Moscow with Averell Harriraan following the Yalta
Conference he was embarking on a mission that was directly
contrary to the most recent evidence of Soviet intentions
expressed by Kennan. A policy that had been revealed to the
State Department eight months earlier. [8]
On February 14, The New York Times reported that Flynn
flew to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman. The story said
Flynn had taken no part in the Crimea Conference but had
simply accompanied the President "as an old friend and
associate." In conclusion, the story said "It was emphasized
that there was no significance in Mr. Flynn's mission to the
Soviet Union." The following day, The Times reported on
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Flynn's activity
-iny l M0SC0W sa^ng he sat next to Soviet
Foreign Commissar Molot-ou »*.n ot v at a performance of the Bolshoi
Ballet. The story said "WhilP Mr riw e . Flynn said he had no
official mission here he was much interested in Poland."
Only after several weeks did T^-Ji^ begin to £uspect that
Flynn was up to more in Moscow than a simple vacation.
In a story datelined Rome on March 6, The Time.
confirmed that Flynn would visit the Pope after leaving
Moscow. According to the report, "Despite President
Roosevelt's bypassing of a press conference question
concerning Mr. Flynn"s mission to Moscow, the impression
prevails that Mr. Flynn has been selected to provide the
preliminary liaison between Moscow and the Vatican and that
he may become the key figure in an eventual rapprochement."
The story concluded by saying Archbishop Spellman of New
York was expected in Rome at the same time as Flynn.
By the time Flynn reached Rome his mission was front
page news. On March 23, as the war in Europe was raging
toward its conclusion, The Times reported Flynn had been
granted an audience with Pius XII which lasted "far longer
than the usual personal pilgrimage." It also reported that
Flynn met with bishops Montini and Tardini of the Vatican
Secretariat of State. According to The Times . "Mr. Flynn
smiled and said 'no comment* at a press conference when
asked if he had discussed with Premier Stalin efforts toward
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a rapprochement between m«„Moscow and the Holy See. 'I don't
think I ought to discuss it until I get home and discuss it
with him [Roosevelt],' but admitted rgports ,^^ ^
speculation '
.
" [ 10
]
By this time FDR had received a preliminary report
from Harriman indicating there still might be a possibility
of success. On March 14 Harriman sent a top-secret dispatch
to the President telling him that Flynn had concluded the
Moscow portion of his mission and had left for Rome, by way
of Teheran. Harriman said Flynn met twice with Molotov, and
"Although he declined to give Ed a message to the Vatican,
Molotov showed undisguised interest in the subject." He said
Molotov was pessimistic about the possibility of success but
"he indicated without saying so directly that he was open to
suggestions." He believed, however, that the while the door
was still open the ending of hostility would have to begin
with Rome. [11]
While in Moscow, John Melby, a Foreign Service officer
assigned to the U.S. Embassy, was given the task of
accompanying Flynn on his travels in the Soviet Union.
According to Melby, Flynn told him in the course of their
weeks together that FDR "hoped to get some kind of Kremlin -
Vatican concordat, to end the feud between those two great
power bases." Melby confirmed that Molotov felt the Vatican
would be more troublesome on the issue, but told Flynn "...
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go ahead and talk with n c nthe Pope and see how he feels about
it." He said he believed ru„„ nnev Flynn already knew the Pope would
"if not enthusiastically, still go along with the idea."
Melby said Flynn was so confident an agreement would be
reached that Flynn asked him if he would be interested in
being his assistant in Rome when Roosevelt appointed hi* to
serve as liaison between the Vatican and the Kremlin. At the
same time Flynn told Melby not to discuss what he had told
him with anyone from the State Department "because neither
Stettinius nor anybody else in the State Department knows
anything about it." According to Melby, Flynn said "This is
a straight White House operation." The only one who would
have any information was Harriman. [12]
In the meantime, the State Department was attempting
to get some idea of what Flynn's mission was about. On March
8 Grace Tully, the President's secretary, placed a memo on
the President's desk informing him that Mr. Bohlen of the
State Department telephoned with a message from Harriman
that Flynn was about to leave Moscow, and was seeking
authorization to make travel arrangements and to pay for
them. She said Bohlen told her "the State Department says
they do not know the nature of his work but if he is on an
official mission all they ask is that you send a chit over
authorizing them to pay for his expenses." Bohlen may have
been seeking to get some hint from FDR on the nature of what
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Flynn was up to ln Moscoh ^ ?dr ^ ^ ^ ^
any infection before he „as ready 0n^ ^ ^ ^ ^
simple »e n o to Secretary Stettinius stating: "I hereby
authorize the State Department to take care o £ all expenses
in connection with Honorable Edward J. Flynn . £ co „ fidential
mission abroad." [13]
On the same day the press was reporting on Flynn's
audience with the Pope, Flynn prepared a lengthy memorandum
for FDR that was sent to Washington with Taylor's diplomatic
correspondence. He outlined for the President his
conversations with Molotov which centered, as FDR's
conversation with Stalin at Teheran, on the domestic
political reaction of American Catholics to Soviet
activities. Flynn told Molotov "there are many millions of
Roman Catholics in the United States" and that "the
President was extremely anxious to create as good feelings
as possible between the people of the United States and the
Soviet Union." He pointed out "That a rapprochement between
the Soviet Union and the Vatican would do much to improve
the relations between the two countries." Molotov repeatedly
stressed the Soviet position that the Vatican was openly
hostile to the Soviet Union, and at one point commented that
the "Vatican had often made favorable steps towards Germany,
even Hitlerite Germany; but that it rarely had a good thing
to say about the Soviet Union." Harriman raised the issue of
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the Homan Catholic Church i„ Polana and t „. Sovtet , s
intentions there. Moiotov replied that "the Red Ar.v h ad
liberated Poland and that he had never heard that it.Pt««« there had .„ , tt„ t , „ ^^.^ ^
the Polish people." [14]
Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union respected all
religions as long as they did not "interweave their policies
with Policies hostile to the Sovxct Union." He was dealing
with politics and not religious dogma and "the attitude of
the Vatican is not only not friendly towards the Soviet
Union, but unneutral." Flynn said Molotov thanked him for
the frank exchange of views and promised to give the matter
further consideration. He then said he would inform his
colleagues of their conversations. This left Flynn and
Harriman to believe "the door was deliberately left open for
further conversations or for further action." He concluded
it was his personal opinion "that some sort of rapprochement
might be worked out." [15]
The Flynn mission had attracted the attention of
more than just the western press. Writing in his diary on
March 23, Joseph Goebbels also commented on the Flynn
mission to the Pope noting "Clearly Roosevelt wants to win
the Catholic Church over to his side." Goebbels claimed the
Pope had been displeased with the results of the Yalta
Conference but that other considerations were at work as
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"The Americans are Morking ^^^^ in backsround ^
cheat not o„ ly th . Sovtets „ Bt also British ^ t o{
international game." Goebbels a foo t this point was grasping at
any straw which might ind-ir^f* , u5 icate a breakdown in relations
between the »n ie, He still held out, even at this l.ts
date, for a
.irscle which would allow the Reich to conclude
a separate peace, and his ».i» ho pe still rested with the
Soviets
. [ 16
]
On March 23 Taylor wired Secretary Stettinius that
presented Flynn that morning to Pius XII "following which
there ensued for forty-five minutes a full review of Mr.
Flynn's recent visit to Russia, the details of which are
Pledged to be strictly secret and as there is no apparent
urgency in the situation I am convinced that it would be
more appropriate for Mr. Flynn to report to you in person
than through me by message." In spite of the widespread
speculation in the press concerning the state of the
President's health there was "no apparent urgency" in
sending a diplomatic wire on the results of Flynn's talk
with the Pope. This view was reinforced on March 29 when
Flynn cabled Harriman that nothing had happened requiring
immediate attention but that if something did Taylor would
contact him. Flynn concluded by saying "Will write after
talk with President." [17]
he
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Flynn arrived ln London on^ ^ ^ ^^.^
«ith Churchili and other Brittsh ^^^^ whiie tn^ ^
learned o f the President's sudden death on April 12 . He
immediately for Uachin.j.Washington, faced with the task of informing
a new President of » a straight White House operation" of
which the new occupant knew nothing. In his memoirs, Truman
says he met with Flynn almost immediately upon his return to
Washington, but that Flynn brought up domestic politics
which he felt inappropriate to discuss under the
circumstances. He told Flynn they would get together at a
later date. For Flynn to have brought up domestic politics
is entirely consistent with the nature of his mission. FDR
had framed his discussions with Stalin on Poland at Teheran
in terms of domestic political considerations. Flynn's
discussions with Molotov revolved around FDR's concern about
acceptance of Soviet policy in terms of American public
opinion, particularly Catholic opinion. The entire mission
revolved around domestic politics. Truman, however, had no
idea what FDR was thinking when he sent Flynn to Moscow, and
neither did anyone in the State Department. [18]
Melby said Flynn sent word to him that he felt "pretty
sure that Mr. Truman, once he got used to the idea of being
President and got caught up on his homework, was going to
tell him to go ahead and do it, carry through with it."
Flynn was right. Truman's appointment calendar for July 3,
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as he was preparing for the upcoming Potsdam Conference,
lists an appointment with Flynn arranged by Democratic
National Committee Chairman Robert Hannegan. Hannegan
apparently "thought [it was] important for the President to
talk with Hon. Edward J. Flynn before going to Big Three
meeting." By this time Melby was back in the United States,
having returned to attend the San Francisco conference
opening the United Nations. He met Flynn in New York who
told him "he was still very confident that the thing
[Kremlin-Vatican concordat] was going on." Melby also
confirmed that in Flynn's meetings with Pius the Pope, while
not enthusiastic had expressed interest and told him, "Go
ahead and see what you can do. See what we can work out."
The available evidence suggests then that Flynn had
commitments from both Molotov and Pius XII to continue to
seek a resolution. [19]
The Potsdam Conference marked the beginning of a new
era in the nature of U.S. - Soviet relations. Harriman had
been urging FDR to take a harder line with the Soviets since
the previous September. Relations had steadily worsened over
the Polish issue and the question of the makeup of the
Polish government since the end of the Yalta Conference.
Harriman reported that Stalin seemed genuinely shaken by
Roosevelt's death, but said he assumed there would be no
changes in policy. He agreed to Harriman's suggestion that
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ns
Molotov attend lhe opening cerenonie£ of ^ ^
in San Francisco as a gesture of respect for the dead
President. In aid-April Tru*a„ gathered his foreign poiicy
advisors to assess the situation regarding U.S.
-Soviet
relations
. [20 ]
The record of this meeting reveals there indeed would
be a change in Policy. Harriman restated his concern,
^pressed in a Personal memo to Harry Hopkins the Previous
September, that the Soviets viewed the American attitude of
"generosity and cooperation" as a sign of weakness and
approval of their policies. Terming the current Soviet
activity a "barbarian invasion of Europe" Harriman said
Soviet control of a country meant the extension of the
Soviet system complete with secret police, extinction of
freedom of speech and other freedoms. Truman repeatedly
expressed his intent to be "firm" with the Russians. The new
President said the Russians needed us more than we needed
them and that while he did not "expect to get 100 percent of
what we wanted... on important matters he felt that we should
be able to get 85 percent." [21]
President Truman did not share FDR's belief that
giving the Soviets their way in eastern Europe was a method
for establishing an atmosphere of trust. More importantly,
he did not share FDR's belief, as expressed to Spellman in
September of 1943, that the United States would not play an
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important role in Europe aft„ the ^ ^ ^
circle of advisors he was gatherin s around hi,, were
believers in the concept of the "American Century"
Proclaimed hy Henry Luce in 1941. i ruma „ brought
. „ore
nationalist viewpoint to the Presidency in contrast to FDR's
internationalist viewpoint.
Nonetheless, in September, with the war in the Pacific
over, and relations with the Soviets becoming increasingly
acrimonious, Truman approved a resumption of the Flynn
miSSi0n
-
The New York Time* reported on September 12 that
Flynn, after meeting with Truman at the White House, "would
return to Rome and Moscow to complete a special diplomatic
mission he undertook for President Roosevelt." However,
Flynn suffered a heart attack in early November, and was
never able to reopen the discussions
.[ 22
]
Roosevelt's death probably ended what little chance of
success that existed for achieving a rapprochement between
the Vatican and the Kremlin, although Truman did approve a
resumption of Flynn's mission. Stalin had already set in
motion his plan to make the Russian Orthodox Church an
instrument of Soviet policy, and without the influence of
FDR to attempt a compromise in the Soviet attitude "to do
open battle against the influence of the Vatican," the
result could only be a hardening of American Catholic
anti-Communist opinion. Each new episode of Soviet
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anti-Catholic activity in Eastern Europg brQught ^ & ^
wave of publicity, and statements from high ranking
of the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic politicians.
Catholics were not the only Americans with an aversion to
Communism. However, their growing political strength
combined with the official ant i
-Communist position of the
church led to the series of policy conflicts outlined here.
In turn FDR's postwar planning took into account early in
the war Catholic attitudes and the prospect, which he tried
to head off, of renewed charges of Roosevelt sympathy for
Communism. When Joseph McCarthy stood before the Republican
convention in 1952 and charged the Democrats with twenty
years of treason, millions of Catholics and millions of
other Americans were willing to believe him.
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